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Abstract
The constitutional purpose of intellectual property is to “promote the progress of science
and useful arts.” Given the utilitarian basis of patents, it is critical that policies and laws
must be continually adjusted to reflect the needs of new technologies. When the law tries
to shield itself from rather than confront the realities of underlying technologies, patents
end up actually subverting rather than promote technological progress. This paper
explores why the natural extracts doctrine belongs to the class of doctrines that subvert
progress. The doctrine, established over a century ago to enable the patenting of purified
compounds for use as drugs, represent codification of old, outdated science, by allowing
genes to be patented. While this paper does not give a whole scale solution regarding the
policies that best incentivize biotechnological innovations, it does show how the natural
extracts doctrine and the genetic patents it has spawned can impede innovations in the
biotechnological context. It ends by offering a glimpse of how eliminating the natural
extracts doctrine can remove not only some of unnecessary wrinkles in current patent law
but more importantly the many current and future patent shackles to biotechnological
innovations.
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I)

Introduction

As science and technology play increasingly vital roles in society, laws and policies
designed to promote their advancements have come under increasing scrutiny. The everrising stakes have spurred increasingly bitter debates over how best to incentivize
innovations.1 U.S. patent law features a property-based system for incentvizing
innovation.2 Property based intellectual property (IP) systems, however, present doubleedged swords.3 As long understood, even as patents spur innovations, they also cause
underutilization of those innovations and even disincentivization of follow-on
innovations.4
Many technologists see the 21st century as the century of biotechnology. However,
today’s biotechnology industry is at a critical crossroad. Despite the industry’s
impressive progress over the last three or so decades and the consensus that patents have
played and will continue to play an important role in promoting the development of the
industry, there is fear also that patent practices in biotechnology have gotten out of
control and are spurring current economic activities at tomorrow’s expenses. The Scripps
and Amgen recombinant technology cases (featuring disputes over biomolectular
extraction technologies)5 showcased how patents that incentivized innovations in one era
may actually end up blocking innovations in a subsequent era. Since genomics patents
touch upon far more technologies than purification innovations, the Scripps and Amgen
cases importantly foreshadowed how serious the cost of blocking patents in the genetics
context can be.
This paper addresses the problems of overly broad patents in biotechnology.
Specifically, it addresses why the practice of patenting genes can be counterproductive to
the development of the biotechnological field. The paper traces the legal foundation of
genetic and other broad biotech patents to an obscure legal doctrine heretofore referred to
as the natural extracts doctrine, whereby extracts obtained from nature, even if
unmodified in molecular structure, are deemed patentable if the extracted substance (in
bulk form) provides some novel therapeutic properties despite the fundamental
prohibition against the patenting of nature. This doctrine, together with the Chakrabarty
case, has opened a floodgate of biotechnological patenting activities. The Federal Circuit
has tried to stem the patent floodtide by creating new doctrines such as a modified written
specifications requirement. However, by failing to acknowledge the natural extracts
doctrine, which systematically create overly broad patents through a construction of
patentable “manufacture” ungrounded in technological reality, as the real culprit
underlying biotech’s patenting floodgate, the court has thus far not met much success.
Broad patents are especially harmful in science-based industries where innovations take
place in multiple rounds such as biotech, as early patents interfere with latter patents to
stymie subsequent follow-on innovations. The paper presents an economics framework
for understanding such harms. By introducing an economic framework for understanding
patents and applying the framework in a way that is informed by insights into the nature
of biotechnological innovations today, the paper recommends that the natural extracts
doctrine, together with the broad patents it has spawned, be promptly and decisively
abandoned.

Page 1 of 49

II)

General Sense of Unease

The impressive rise of the American biotechnology sector has been nothing short of
amazing.6 Since the creation of the first genetically engineered organisms in 1973,7 the
industry has grown into a critical, multi-billion dollar industry.8 Many have cited the
availability of strong patents as key to the U.S. success, 9 which some of observed as
enabling and incentivizing the private sector to carry out more and more of the industry’s
R&D.10 But despite the apparent importance of patents, there is also a general unease at
the current explosion of patenting activity.11 As the number of applications skyrocketed
and scope of subject matter exploded, some have questioned whether the issuance of
broad fundamental patnets might be incentivizing current innovations at the expense of
the future progress.12 Biotechnology is a field where innovations take place in multiple
rounds.13 The ultimate benefit of a breakthrough is often not available until several
rounds into the innovation life cycle when combined with multiple subsequent
innovations.14 For example, while the sequencing of a gene by itself may be exciting,
much still need to be discovered and invented before life-enhancing applications become
a reality.15 The ultimate applications will come when knowledge generated from those
genes will allow doctors to diagnose and treat currently uncurable diseases. If too much
patents incentives are awarded too early in the innovation life cycle today, little
incentives may be available to drive the rest of innovations needed to create those
ultimate applications tomorrow.16
A) Controversy over Genetic Patents
i)

An issue of number and scope

As of 1999, the USPTO has awarded nearly 3,000 patents related to human genes (that’s
about 10% about the estimated 30,000 – 40,000 genes that exist in the human genome).17
Craig Venter made news when he filed 6,500 provisional patent applications over human
genes in October 1999.18 To some, the increase in patent applications reflects
innovations in the area;19 to others, the increase reflects merely legal bickering and
squatter.20
Gene patents are especially problematic because of their broad scopes. Today’s gene
patents cover much more than just the nucleotide structure and amino acid sequences
(though even that would be problematic21), but also potential derived products and uses.
For example, many EST22 applications claim not just the isolated sequences, but also the
use of the genes for diagnostic purposes; the use of the genes as tools in genetic research;
the use of the genes in gene regulation applications such as antisense and triple helix
applications; even all sequences located by the disclosed EST.23 It is not uncommon for
one to claim “not only the specific ESTs that had actually been identified and sequenced,
but also complementary sequences, allelic variations and portions thereof, full genes
corresponding or hybridizing to any of the foregoing sequences, fragments of such full
genes, vectors containing any such sequences or genes, panels of ESTS or sequence
fragments, and antisense oligonucleotides or triple helix probes capable of blocking
expression of the products of the full genes.”24 Patent number 6,093,809 (issued July 25,
2000) is a prototypical broad gene patent. The patent is directed not just at the nucleic
acids and amino acids of telomerase, an enzyme imputed in the aging and cancer
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mechanisms, but also all “related” DNA sequences; all drugs derived from the protein
coded by the sequence; the use of the sequences in genetic studies; and all
pharmacological compositions that could be envisioned at the time.25
In general, it has become questionable whether patent incentives are really appropriate
for genes26 when sequencing has become increasingly routine and automated and would
most likely continue unabated even without patent incentives.27 Today, the status of gene
patents remains uncertain.28 Even as the U.S.P.T.O. has officially pronounced genes to
be patentable subject matter, the P.T.O. has also allowed a very long backlog of patent
applications to build up.29 Fearing the harm such patents can cause to future research,
some in the private sector have taken the problem into their own hands. Ten prominent
pharmaceutical companies, for example, have joined to form a consortium called the
Wellcome Trust. The goal is to patent a collection of SNPs30 only to disavow them,
legally preventing others from patenting a library of SNPs.31
ii)

Fundamental disagreement over the effectiveness of gene patents to
incentivize innovations in biotech

The disagreement over genetic patents is reminiscent of recent controversies over other
expansions of patentable subject matter such as those to software and business methods.
However, on closer examination, the gene patent controversy is also very different.32 The
primary concern about software and business methods patents related to patent quality.
The PTO, which bases most of its prior art research on the patent literature, issued many
patents of questionable quality because it did it not possess a library of patents that
adequately reflected the prior art. As the prior art patents have built up, however, so
seemingly have the uproar over software and business patents. The controversies over
gene patent, on the other hand, are driven in addition by fundamental disagreements over
the effect of patents.33 As this paper will argue, any novelty derived from gene research
today involves the actual extraction and/or application of genetic sequences, not the gene
sequences by themselves. The sequences have existed in the natural human body,
passing from generations to generations, since time immortality. While some believe that
gene product patents [gene patents, for short] are necessary and proper for driving
innovation in biotech, many others believe that that gene patents create unnecessary costs
of innovations.34
B) Scripps and Amgen’s Recombinant DNA Cases
Two high profile biotechnology cases in the late 1980’s demonstrate the threats broad
patents can pose to long-term technological progress. In Scripps Clinic and Research
Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., patentee Scripps sued Genentech over Genentech’s effort
to commercialize recombinant Factor VIII:C.35 Factor VIII:C is a naturally occurring
protein found in the human body essential to blood clotting, and the purified form was a
leading drug candidate to treat hereditary bleeding disorders such as hemophilia.36
Scripps had previous isolated Factor VIII:C from human blood plasma from large sources
of blood and obtained a patent over purified Factor VIII:C.37 Because of the
inefficiencies involved in Scripp’s analog purification techniques, it was not until
Genentech’s recombinant DNA techniques that Factor VIII:C began to hold out real
commercial promise.38 To the dismay of many, the courts held that Genentech’s
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recombinantly produced Factor VIII:C infringed Scripp’s original patent over
monoclonal-derived Factor VIII:C.39
In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Amgen sued, among other reasons,
to declare that its efforts to commercialize recombinant erythropoietin (EPO)40 did not
infringe United States Patent No. 4,677,195, to which Chugai was a licensee.41 EPO is a
naturally occurring substance found in the human body essential to red blood cell
production,42 and the purified form was among a leading drug candidate to treat disorders
such as anemia and renal anemia.43 The ‘195 patent disclosed a method to isolate and
purify EPO from urine.44 Because of the large quantities of urine required, EPO did not
offer commercial viability until Amgen succeeded in manufacturing EPO with
recombinant techniques.45 Again, to the dismay of many, the court held that Amgen’s
recombinantly produced EPO infringed Chugai’s analog EPO.46
The disputes in Scripps and Amgen raised serious concerns about the power of patents to
impede long-term progress in the biotech industry. Because of the natural extracts
doctrine, a pioneer – by virtue of being first to isolate a compound from nature – can
obtain a patent on not just the isolation process, but also on the isolated products as well.
While this might incentivize current innovations, it also produces overly broad patents
that can block47 many important follow-on and related innovations.48
III)

The broad reach of the natural extract doctrine

A) The subject matter restriction against the patenting of nature
To understand the significance of allowing purified compounds and genes to be patented,
one should start with the traditional subject matter restriction again the patenting of
nature. U.S. case law has long established that laws of nature, natural phenomena,
abstract ideas, unapplied mathematical algorithms, and product of nature are not
patentable subject matter.49 A new mineral discovered in nature, a new plant found in the
wild, rules of nature such as Einstein’s celebrated equation E=mc2 or Newton’s law of
gravity all do not constitute patentable subject matter.50
It might at first seem perplexing why discoveries of nature should not be patentable.
Clearly discoveries of nature can be very important and useful (think for example, the
discovery of electricity, the existence of microorganisms, and the laws of motion).51 And
since discoveries of nature often do require tremendous resources and risk undertaking,
such discoveries would seem amenable to patent incentives. On the other hand,
fundamental knowledge about nature occupies a special role in the advancement of
knowledge. By opening doors to new fields of inquiries and applications, knowledge
about nature serve as pillars on subsequent scientific and technological advancements can
build.52 While the privitization basic knowledge might spur basic research activities, the
danger of such private monoplization pose to general progress has long been deemed
high enough to outweigh the potential benefits to justify the preservation of the subject
matter restriction against the patenting over nature.53
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B) A constructive delineation of the artificial from the natural
Despite the long-standing subject matter restriction against the patenting of nature, U.S.
law has long carved out a prominent though narrow exception for purified products
isolated from nature in the biological and medical sciences. The law does so by
constructively defining patentable “manufacture.” Under the natural extracts doctrine, so
long as a compound required human activity to obtain and conferred novel properties not
found in the natural form, the compound would be considered patentable subject matter –
even if the actual isolated product had always existed in nature. Pasteur was thus
allowed, for example, to patent in 1873 his famous yeasts even no new species of yeasts
were created as a result of the isolation.54
The modern origins of the natural extracts doctrine can be traced to Learned Hand’s
seminal Parke-Davis decision. In Parke-Davis, Learned Hand held that purified
adrenaline was patentable subject matter because it required human effort to extract and
the extracted product differed “not in degree, but in kind” from that of the naturally
occurring form.55 In Parke-Davis, Hand did not delve into the underlying science to
ascertain whether a new compound was really created.56 Instead Hand took a pragmatic,
layman’s approach57 to delineate the boundary between artificial and natural.58 Since
purified adrenaline “for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and
therapeutically,” it constituted patentable subject matter.59
Modern courts have widely adopted Hand’s approach. For example, in the Amgen and
Genentech, the courts held the original patents over purified EPO and Factor VIII:C to be
patentable subject matter because the products required human intervention to isolate and
because the isolated products offered novel therapeutic properties for patients. In In re
Bergy, the CCPA held a “biologically pure culture of the microorganism Streptomyces
vellosus” to be patentable subject matter because such cultures “can be produced only
under carefully controlled laboratory conditions” and allowed researchers to collect
antibiotic lincomycin in sizable quantities for the first time.60 In Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court held that a genetically engineered bacterium to be
patentable subject matter because by offering the capability to break down multiple
components of crude oil, the bacteria offered “markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature” and constituted “a product of human ingenuity.”61
C) The patentability of genes
Given the strong traditional subject matter restriction against the nature and the limited
scope by which natural extracts doctrine have applied to purified compounds, one would
at first guess that genes would not constitute patentable subject matter. After all, genes
have existed for almost as long as life has existed on earth. They are the templates of life,
passing from generation to generation, and containing instructions that direct all
biological processes. If there were a product of nature, genes would seem it.
The law, however, has not treated genes by their functional roles in biology – as
templates and directions for life, which presumptively would not be patentable.62 Instead
it has treated genetic materials – including DNA’s, cDNA’s, RNA’s, EST’s, SNP’s, etc. –
as chemical molecules – as a drug of sorts.63 Like purified adrenaline, so long as genes
require human effort to isolate and confer a special property (this usually means finding

Page 5 of 49

some sort of utility for genes)64 that the natural form does not require, genes can be
patented.65
For many, the reduction of the genetic patentability debate into an issue of chemical
patentability is disingenuous since the main purpose and effect of patenting genes is for
control over the use of genetic information.66 Genes are much more than the DNA in
which they are encapsulated. Treating genes as chemicals, instead what they truly are as
life directing instructions and templates, prevents the true merits of genetic patents from
being examined.67 Only by recognizing the broad ramifications gene patents have on
research and innovations can the law fully confront the issues raised by such patents.68
IV)

The Chakrabarty floodgate and patchwork of solutions

Prior to 1980, life forms and genes were considered a part of nature and thus not
patentable subject matter. In the seminal Chakrabarty decision, the Supreme Court held
that microorganisms were not categorically unpatentable since patentable subject matter
“include anything under the sun that is made by man.”69 The decision has serious
ramifications to all of biotechnology since it has opened a floodgate of patenting
activities in biotechnology, not just over recombinant organisms, but also over genes.
Today a large number of genes are being patented – from genes with known functions to
those with little understood functions, from gene fragments (such as ESTs and SNPS) to
complete genes. In an attempt to tame the floodgate, the P.T.O. and the courts have taken
a couple of approaches. The PTO has required researchers to understand at least some
functions of genes before taking out patents over the genes.70 The Federal Circuit has
tried to promulgate a new written specification requirement to invalidate many of the
more “speculative” biotech patents,71 creating an intra-Circuit controversy that the
Federal Circuit Bar Association Patent and Trademark Appeals Committee has cited as
one of the top conflicts in current Federal Circuit jurisprudence.72
A) The utility requirement as gateway to patentability of genes
The U.S. P.T.O. currently deems genes – more specifically “excised genes” – to be
patentable subject matter as long as the patentee has characterized some of the gene's
functions.73 The emphasis on utility to control issuance of speculative, overly broad
patents is, ironically, reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s failed earlier attempts to rein in
the speculative patents in general.74 In Brenner v. Manson, the U.S. Supreme Court
declared that the purpose of patents is to protect inventions with “substantial utility” – i.e.
inventions with concrete present-day not speculative future uses.75 The Court struck
down a patent over a tumor-fighting drug candidate where the only indication of utility
was that the compound's structure was similar to that of another compound that had
previously been proven to inhibit tumor in mice.76 Concerned that early, broad patents
will impede subsequent innovations,77 the Court famously pronounced, “a patent is not a
hunting license”;78 a patent is “not a reward for the search, but compensation for its
successful conclusion.”79 Subsequent case law would show that Brenner’s specific
utility approach would be too unwieldy to apply for controlling illicit patenting
activities.80 The line between early and applied research has been made even more
difficult to draw since many biotechnological innovations claim as their primary
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functions basic research tools.81 “Substantial utility” has ceased to be a generally
practiced doctrine,82 except apparently in the context of genomics.
B) Federal Circuit’s new quid pro quo written specifications requirement
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires patent applicant to submit “a written descriptions of the
invention … in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art … to make and use the [invention], and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”83 § 112 is the statutorial
basis of the so-called patentability disclosure requirement, which consists of three
components – enablement, written specifications, and best mode. Enablement
traditionally is considered to represent the quid pro quo of the basic patent bargain.84 In
return for a grant of monopoly rights, a patentee must disclose the invention in sufficient
details to enable the public to practice it.85 In a deal where society recognizes a
temporary monopoly of the inventor’s creation, the inventor must disclose enough to
place the public “in possession”86 of the invention.87
In trying to stem the flood of post-Chakrabarty biotech patents,88 some in Federal Circuit
believe it necessary to alter this time-tested basic patent bargain and elevate a separate
requirement – the written specifications requirement – to be a quid pro quo requirement
“separate and distinct” from that of enablement.89 In Regents of UC v. Eli Lilly and Co.
case, the court held that a patent claiming all DNA encoding vertebrate and mammalian
insulin to be defective when it did not disclose the actual DNA sequences even though it
did disclose an enabled method for obtaining those sequences.90 In Univ. of Rochester v.
G.D. Searle Inc., the court invalidated a patent that disclosed a method allowing one
skilled in the art to isolate a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug but not the actual
structure of the drug by characterizing the invention as but “a research plan.”91
Responding to criticisms that the gist of disclosure has always centered on enablement
(i.e. what an innovation contribute to the state of the art), not some ad-hoc judicially
created standard, a panel of the Federal Circuit in Enzo Biochem v. Gene-Probe Inc.
asserted that enablement served but one purpose of disclosure.92 In Eli Lilly & Co., a
panel went declared that disclosure of all biological molecules categorically must include
“a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical
properties.”93 In Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic Richfield Co., the court
backpeddled a little when it held that “[t]he written descriptions requirement does not
require the applicant ‘to describe exactly the subject matter claimed, [but only that] the
description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the
applicant] invented what is claimed.’”94
Articulating the court’s apparent befuddlement, one judge recently explained, “[n]ew
interpretations of old statutes in light of new fact situations occur all the time. I believe
these issues have arisen in recent years [because] … the perceptions that patents are
stronger [now] tempt patent owners to try to assert their patents beyond the original
intentions of the inventors and their attorney. … Claims are now being asserted to cover
what was not reasonably described in the patent.”95 Another judge explained, “‘consider
the case where the specification discusses only compound A and contains no broadening
language of any kind. This might very well enable one skilled in the art to make and use
compounds B and C; yet the class consisting of A, B and C has not been
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described.’…This is surely part of the recent history of some biotechnology patents.”96
Judges fear that biotechnology patents are being used to carry out “fishing expeditions.”97
An exacerbated judge lamented, “among the problems in comprehension of the issues in
a biotech context is that a functional description of DNA does not indicate which DNA
has been invented. And simply acknowledging the presence of a DNA that serves a
particular function, whose existence has been postulated since, perhaps, Mendel, plus a
general process for finding it, is not a description of the DNA. It is a research plan at best,
and does not show ‘possession’ of any invention.”98
The attempt to create a new written specification requirement has drawn mixed reactions.
Some have applauded the court’s action as a necessary check on the explosion of biotech
patents99 while others have denounced it as an overly reactionary response that
unnecessarily distorts established patent doctrines.100 This author’s view is more in line
with the latter group. The traditional enablement doctrine has functioned as a gatekeeper
of patentability for a wide variety of fields for a long time.101 It is conceptually simple
and rigorous. Before formulating an entire new doctrine on the basic quid pro quo of
patenting, a formulation of what it is so unique about biotechnology that requires an
additional doctrine beyond enablement must be articulated by its proponents.102 Creating
a new written descriptions requirement should not be casually undertaken. Such efforts
could be dangerous as it risks unsettling established judicial expectations,103 raises the
specter of “judicial improvisation,”104 and can lead to unintended harmful
consequences.105
C) A better tack to controlling the Chakrabarty floodgate
Rather than relying on an unworkable notion of utility or inventing a new, unproven
doctrine to control the floodgate of biotech patents, this paper will suggest that the better
way to confront the biotech patent explosion directly is by taking a look at the root causes
of the floodgate. Tracing the fundamental cause to the natural extracts doctrine, the rest
of the paper discusses why this doctrine, and the broad patents it produces, is the main
cause of today’s problem in biotech patent proliferation and ought to be promptly
abandoned if patents are to effectively incentivize long-term innovations in the field.
V)

The natural extracts doctrine codifies outdated science and
produces systematically overly broad patents

As alluded earlier, the natural extracts doctrine dictates that products extracted from
nature constitute patentable subject matter as long as the extraction involves human
intervention and the isolated product offers novel properties unavailable through the
natural form.106 This doctrine was doctrinally useful in bypassing the underlying science
to allow for the patenting of natural extracts in despite of subject matter restrictions
against the patenting of nature. This section discusses how the doctrine, created
originally to shield judges from having to evaluate and justify patenting against the
underlying technological realities, endangers the future of the biotech industry by
enforcing a judicially presumed granularity at which innovations are evaluated, codifying
old, outdated science, causing systematic confusion between process and product
innovations and producing systematically overly broad patents.
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A) The level of granularity at which innovations under the natural extracts
doctrine are evaluated is unarticulated and judicially presumed
The boundary between the “natural” and “artificial” as defined by the natural extracts
doctrine depends heavily on an unstated and uninformed level of granularity at which
innovations are evaluated. Contrast the cases of Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co and In re Bergy.107 The Funk Brothers invention concerned a unique
mixture of bacteria which when applied to certain leguminous plants enabled the plants to
fix nitrogen directly from air.108 The In Re Bergy invention concerned a purified culture
of Streptomyces vellosus which allowed researchers to collect antibiotic lincomycin in
sizable quantities. Under Parke-Davis, both microorganism cultures should be patentable
subject matter: both inventions required human invention to produce and both products
exhibited novel, useful properties. Yet, the courts held that the nitrogen fixing mixture in
Funk was not patentable subject matter109 while the purified lincomycin producing
culture in Bergy was.
These two seemingly inconsistent results can be explained by the granularity at which the
courts examined the invention. In Funk, the Court insisted on drilling down and
evaluating the bacteria at a more microscopic level. The Court invalidated the patent on
the ground that “[t]he combination of species produces no new bacteria, no change in the
[disclosed] species of bacteria…. Each species has the same effect it always had. The
bacteria perform in their natural way.”110 The Court concluded, “these bacteria, like the
heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none.”111 On the toher hand, in Bergy, the court, in the true spirit
of the natural extracts doctrine, assessed the invention at a high level of granularity from
end user’s perspective. Purified culture of Streptomyces vellosus became a new,
artificial, patentable “manufacture” – as that is how an end user of these purified culture
would view the product. Issues such as whether any new bacteria were created or
whether each bacterium functioned individually the way as it had always in nature was
not relevant when evaluated at this macroscopic level.
The discrepancies between Funk and Bergy illustrate the importance of the granularity at
which innovations are evaluated under the natural extracts doctrine. Had the Court in
Funk assessed the bacteria at a more macroscopic levels as in Bergy or Parke-Davis, the
law should have deemed the Funk bacteria a patentable “manufacture.” Had the Funk
court treated the underlying innovation as a black box, all that would have mattered was
that production of the bacteria required human efforts and the bacteria offered novel
characteristics (i.e. nitrogen fixing) unavailable through the natural form. By the same
token, had the Bergy court – or, for that matter, the Parke-Davis, Amgen, and Scripps
courts – evaluated each of the respective final purified products at a low enough level of
granularity, each court would have found no “artificial” product to have been created
since in any of the cases, no new creation would have been created; all that would have
occurred would have been a mere restructuring of natural elements.112
Even the invention in the seminal Chakrabarty case is not immune to the level of
granularity at which it is evaluated. At the granularity of the organism level, the Court
correctly pronounced that a new “manufacture” was produced: a new organism with a
never before seen characteristic, the ability to break down oil slick, was indeed created.
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However, at a lower level of granularity, say at the genetic level, the Court could easily
have found no “manufacture.” All that would have occurred was a reshuffling of genes
(the transfer of an otherwise naturally occurring gene from one species to another) not
unlike the reshuffling of bacteria in Funk.113 At this level of granularity, the genes
worked as they always did, and the newly endowed characteristic was a wholly
predictable phenomenon resulting from the movement of the otherwise natural gene.
Barring a modification to the actual genetic sequence, no “artificial” products would have
been pronounced created.114
In summary, the natural extracts doctrine prescribes as a matter of law that the
appropriate granularity at which innovations are to be evaluated to be high, without
analysis whether this makes sense as a matter of science or technology. Unfortunately, at
a high enough level of granularity all science and technology can appear magical.115 As
the following sections will discuss further, at too high a level of abstraction, isolated from
scientific and technological grounding, the natural extracts doctrine inevitably creates
gaps between the legal and technological understandings of innovations, produces overly
broad patents, and hinders the ability of patents to promote long-term innovations.116
B) Evaluation of properties at end user, macroscopic level codifies
outdated science
One of the problems with evaluating biotech innovations at too high a level of granularity
is that it codifies outdated science. Historically, scientific fields usually move from
higher to ever-lower levels of granularity as the field matures.117 To incentivize
innovations effectively, patents must accurately recognize at each particular time at what
level of granularity the field is advancing and thus to incentivize appropriately the
contributions made to the state of the start at the appropriate level of granularity.118 For
example, if creating recombinant organisms represent the state of the art of the biological
field, then the creation of transgenic organisms by transferring genes between species (as
in Chakrabarty) would constitute patentable subject matter.119 However, if the state of
the art has moved beyond, for example, where the main thrust of the state of art involves
the actual creation of new genetic elements, then the “creation” of new organism by mere
movement of otherwise natural genes would not constitute patentable subject matter.120
Prescribing a judicially mandated granularity at which innovations by treating
innovations like a black box and evaluating innovations by their impacts rather than their
essence inevitably creates systematically overly broad patents.
One of the justifications often put forth in support of the natural extracts doctrine is the
conceptualization of natural discoveries as manmade articulate. This can best be
demonstrated by an appeal to a field like metallurgy. In metallurgy, novel mixtures are
considered patentable “manufacture,”121 even if its constituent components are well
known and “natural.” Supporters of the natural extracts doctrine would argue that if mere
rearrangements of natural elements can give rise to patentable “manufacture” in
metallugry, so should mere rearrangements of molecular elements such as bimolecular
purification in biotechnology. The problem with such reasoning is that it ignores
fundamental differences in the state of the art between the two radically different fields.
The thrust of metallurgy today, as it has been for centuries, is in discovering new
combination of naturally occurring elements to produce heretofore-unavailable
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properties. Thus, the mere rearrangement of natural elements can give rise to an
innovation today as well as centuries ago as long as it produces novel properties.122 On
the other hand, modern biotechnology is a much different field. The thrust of
biotechnological research today is about understanding and manipulating biological
processes at the molecular and genetic level. It is already a very different field from that
of traditional biology or chemistry. In the age of Parke-Davis, the alchemy of brewing
up chemicals might dictate that the creation of any new substance that offered novel
therapeutic effects constituted a concrete advance in the state of the art. Biotechnology
today requires more. Innovations today must also be understood in terms of the
molecular and genetic mechanisms involved.123
Consider a relatively simple technological example. Suppose I made an invention that
doubled the speed at which web pages are displayed on computers by optimizing the
memory component of a computer. At a high enough level of granularity, if one treated
computers as black boxes, I would be credited in general with inventing a new computer
that displayed web pages at twice the speed. That would be an over-recognization of my
invention because any other innovation that would also double the computer web display
speed would also be contributed to me. An expert would characterize my innovation in a
more limited fashion by the contribution I made to the state of the art rather than the
impact my innovation from the perspective of a lay person. In this case, I would only be
credited with at most a memory innovation and an application of that memory invention
to speed up computer browsing, but not a general computer browser speed enhancer
innovation. For patents to recognize properly my inventive contribution, patents must
evaluate my innovation at the proper level of granularity dictated by the state of the art.
It is important for patents to properly recognize innovations by contribution to the state of
the art given the purpose of patents to incentivize innovations. If my patent credits me
with doubling the browsing speed of computers in general, it would over-credit me for
my innovation. Two problems can result. First it could over-incentivize such
innovations, resulting in wasteful races or over-deployment of resources to the endeavor
of doubling computer browsing speed. Second, it could also hamper subsequent
innovative endeavors to double the speed of computer browsing as subsequent innovators
would have to license from me to practice their inventions, even if they should achieve
the doubling of browsing speed by completely unrelated techniques, such as by
increasing the processor speed or increasing the Internet connection speed. It is thus
critical to evaluate innovations at the granularity informed by the state of the art. If my
patent correctly credits me with a memory innovation to double web browsing, endeavors
to incentivize browser innovations would be properly incentivized, with subsequent
innovations also appropriately freed and allowed to occur.124
Because the granularity at which technological innovations is evaluated should be
informed by a good grasp of the state of the art, appealing to the perspective of a person
having ordinary skill in the arts (PHOSITA)125 to help delimit the boundary between the
natural and artificial (and for that matter, on issues of non-obviousness and enablement
also) is quite appropriate given the purpose of patents to incentivize innovations.126
Because a person having ordinary skill in the arts is precisely the type of person a patent
system would target to innovate, patent systems that align their comprehension of
technological progress with such understandings will be most effective in promoting
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innovative advancements.127 While advances in some fields such as alchemy and
metallurgy could be proximally understood by evaluating their societal impact, advances
in most of today’s science-based fields, such as biotechnology, must be evaluated by
solid understanding of the underlying technological contributions, not just their effects.128
When courts continue to specify as a matter of law that advances in science and
technology by evaluated by their effects as under the natural extracts doctrine, the law
risks codifying outdated science, missing the whole point of innovations altogether, and
creating broad patents that in the long term disincentivize rather than incentivize
innovations.
C) Evaluation of properties at end user, macroscopic level confuses
product for process innovations
The natural extracts doctrine also greatly confuses the distinction between product and
process innovations.129 As a result of the confusion, the doctrine often allows the first to
extract, by the mere fact of being first, to obtain a patent on the isolated product as well
even though no innovation is made with respect to the product.130 It is important to
distinguish between product and process innovations because confusing product for
process innovations result in overly broad patents and misaligns patent incentives with
technological needs.131
Product patents confer rights over the isolated product to the first isolator. If patent
understanding is to match that with the state of the art, a researcher should deserve a
product patent only after he has created a new molecular structure. Because a product
patent would preclude all future innovators of alternative, independent extraction
techniques from obtaining a compound with the same molecular structure, product
patents must be awarded carefully. Casually awarding overly broad product patents can
greatly disincentivizes subsequent innovations, by disincentivizing subsequent
innovations of alternative processes to extract the same products.132 Process patents on
the other hand confer rights of a process of isolating a product. It would only exclude
future inventors from practicing the same extraction processes to extract a product but
would free future innovators to invent alternative methods of isolating the same product.
If all that an innovation involves is the extraction of an otherwise existing product from
nature, and not the design or creation of a new molecule, process patents should provide
more than enough incentives and protections. Process patents would properly incentivize
such innovations by preventing others from using the actual process but would at the
same time also protect future innovations by not reaching subsequent innovations
involving alternative processes of extracting the same products.133
A problem with the natural extracts doctrine is that at too high a level of granularity, if
innovations are to evaluated by their effects (e.g., therapeutic use) rather than their
contribution to the state of the art, the distinction between product and process
innovations become blurred. When adrenaline was purified, Hand did not look into
whether the innovation involved just the extraction process or the actual creation of a new
product. Instead, Hand merely looked to the impact on society (i.e. whether a new
therapeutic use was created) and adjudicated, by legal construction, without regard to the
underlying science, that a new product had been created. The problem is that at such a
high enough a level of granularity, all process innovations could be made to look like
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product innovations. But process and product innovations are distinct inventive steps. If
patents are to incentivize technological progress, the law must look to the actual
contribution made to the state of the art, not just to the effects of inventions. Unless the
invention actually involves innovations in the isolated product (e.g., creation of a new
molecular structure to stabilize an otherwise unstable purified product), patents should
issue only on the purification process, not the product purified as well.134
VI)

An Economics Framework for Evaluating Patents

The policy foundation underlying this country’s intellectual property regime is decidedly
utilitarian.135 Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have the
power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by securing for limited times
through establishment of intellectual property rights.136 The Supreme Court has
emphasized the utilitarian basis for patents by emphasizing, for example, that “[t]he
patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his
discoveries. Rather it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.
[Because t]he grant of an exclusive right … was … at odds with the inherent free nature
of disclosed ideas…. [o]nly inventions and discoveries which furthered human
knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private
monopoly.”137 Because of this utilitarian basis, one must view IP law more as a tool to
effectively manage real world, economic activities138 than the development or
perpetration of legal doctrines despite a rich legal doctrinal history accompanying patents
in this country.139 This is especially true whenever an important new technology such as
biotechnology arises. We must continually strive to be informed by the realities of
landscapes new technologies and innovations create so we can create environments that
promote, not hinder, new innovations. This is not easy, for this often requires policy and
lawmakers to be conversant with both technology and law. Nevertheless, it is something
that must be done. It would tragic – if not unconstitutional – if by misunderstanding new
technologies and thus by force fitting old doctrines on new technologies, we should end
up subverting technological progress in the process. This section presents an economics
framework for evaluating patent law and policy that serve as a foundation for the next
section to critique the current state of genomic patenting. It is hoped that these
discussions will shed insights on not only the innovation process and associated
economics, but also a more enlightened IP law and policy.
A) The “public goods” problem of innovations and the patent solution
The purpose of patents is to facilitate the development of useful innovations. Innovation
needs a “helping hand” because it is a “public good”:140 innovations take resources to
develop but are easily copyable, which inevitably by its nature without regulation confers
benefits to others besides the inventor.141 This externalization of benefits disincentivize
the innovative enterprise because externalization can make it difficult for pioneers to
even recoup the cost of their innovations.142 Patents help to incentivize innovations by
limiting the amount of externality through the grant of limited-term, monopoly rights to
inventors over their inventions.143 However, this must not go too far because patents are
double edged swords which incentivize innovation on the one hand but can also impede
innovation by impeding subsequent innovations and increasing the cost the public pays
for innovations. In a properly balanced patent system, patents incentivize innovations not
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so much by decreasing competitions as channeling and focusing the locus of competition
for innovation.144
B) A more detailed analysis of both the immediate and follow-on costs and
benefits of patents
Among the benefits often cited in favor of patents are that they: provide incentives to
innovate; stimulate investment on patentable technologies; rationalize development of
broad technology fields; enable disclosure and dissemination of technical knowledge;145
provides a good yardstick for businesses to assess the value of technology startups.146
Among the costs often cited are that they: encourage costly patent races that wastes
duplicative, overlapping expenditures on R&D; create monopoly profits that result in
deadweight loss to society; increase transaction costs by increasing the associated
licensing and litigation activities; impede the development related and follow-on
innovations through the creation of blocking patents.147
Cost-benefit analysis of the patent system is not new.148 However, most of the literature
has focused on the immediate tradeoff between the incentive of innovation and the
underutilization of the innovation.149 Influential works in this area include those by
Nordhaus, Kaplow, Gilbert, Shapiro, and Klemperer.150
A framework such as one proposed by Merges & Nelson expands the scope of analysis
by explicitly including both these immediate as well as the downstream costs and benefits
of patents.151 In this more comprehensive analysis, both the ability of patent’s ability to
incentivize innovations and cause underutilization of those innovation as well as ability
of patents to internalize follow-on benefits and impede follow-on innovations are
included in the cost-benefit accounting of patents.152
A brief example shows an expanded analysis works. Consider Morse’s claim on
telegraphy and his attempt to broadly claim also all methods of telecommunications, such
as the radio and television.153 The traditional justification for a telegraphy patent is that it
serves to compensate Morse for devoting the resources and taking the risks to develop the
telegraph. The cost of the patent will be born by society in the form of deadweigh loss
and reduced overall utilization of the telegraph. A more expanded analysis will also
attempt to answer how broadly a scope a patent should be awarded to an inventor given
an invention. Should Morse’s invention of the telegraph also entitle him to broad claim
inventions to read on subsequent inventions such as telephones and radios that his
invention will spur but others will still have to invent? The justification for allowing an
inventor to broadly claim is that it can more fully compensate an inventor like Morse
whose invention benefit society not only through the application of the telegraph, but also
the spurring of many related inventions such as telephone and radio. Broad claims will
thus more fully account for the benefits of an inventor’s invention, but that benefit, as we
will see, is counterbalanced by the tendency of broad patents to chill and disincentivize
follow-on innovations as the patent will cover subsequent inventions that the broad claim
will “read on” but that has not actually been “reduced to practice.”154
In an ideal market where transaction cost can be ignored, the issuance of broad patents
does not pose a problem.155 There is no problem because even if patents read on followon innovations, the broad patents are not expected to block subsequent innovations
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because subsequent innovators are expected to negotiate an agreement that share profits
in a fair fashion. The parties are expected to be “fair” because it is in no one’s interest to
block truly worthwhile innovations. If the parties are rational and transaction costs are
not too high, the inventors will work out a deal to allow subsequent innovations to
develop.156 Hence, according to established economic doctrines, the initial distribution of
property rights (such as the issuance of overly broad patents) should not disturb the
outcome of a Pareto superior solution (such as the commercialization of a valuable
follow-on innovation), with the caveat that transaction costs can be ignored.157 In fact, it
is actually beneficial to award property rights generously (i.e. award broad patents) to
ensure that all contributing stakeholders are brought into the negotiation so that each
inventor can be properly awarded, when the time comes, according to the amount of
contribution he makes, however small, at a time when the value of the innovation can be
somewhat ascertained. Broad patents allow pioneers and follow-on innovators to
contract at the latest opportune time to determine the actual, “optimal” distribution of
property rights among them.158
Unfortunately, the problem with this model is that transaction costs cannot usually be
ignored.159 Determining mutually agreeable profit sharing is not always
straightforward,160 especially when the transaction costs caused by information
asymmetry161 and rent seeking is taken into account.162 In reality thus, the determination
of proper patent scope does actually matter. Patents must not be made arbitrarily broad
because overly broad patents can and do impede subsequent innovations.163
C) The appropriate relationship between patent scope and the enabled
innovation
This section discusses a framework for assessing appropriate patent scope.164 Patent
scope is described in this paper as either broad or narrow – with respect to the enabled
technology as understood by a person skilled in the art (PHOSITA).165 Given the goal of
patents to enable innovations, a natural yardstick by which to compare scope is by
referencing to the scope of enablement.166 Broad patents are patents that cover subject
matter that are broader than what is actually enabled by an invention. Conversely,
narrow patents are patents are strictly limited to what is actually enabled by an invention.
In other words, narrow patents are based strictly on what an inventor has enabled, not on
what an innovation might inspire in the future.
i)

Why patent scope should be wider than the enabled innovation

(a) Broad patents are needed to properly incentivize innovations
Perhaps the most compelling argument for broad patent’s is Kitch’s prospector theory of
IP.167 Kitch analogized patent claiming to mining.168 Just as a miner who discovers a
coalfield is entitled to all the coal in the vicinity, not just to the few granules he actually
finds, an inventor is entitled to an area of technology opened up by the innovation, not
just the invention he actually reduced to practice.169 According to Kitch, to justify the
risks and upfront resources needed to make an invention, inventors must be given
“breathing room” to develop their innovations without fear that others, sitting on the
sidelines conserving resources, learning from the pioneer’s initiatives, will unfairly
preempt them at later opportune moments.170
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(b) Broad patents allow pioneers to coordinate follow-on innovations
Another justification for broad patents is Kitch’s theory of coordinated developments.171
Without broad patents, Kitch observed, intense competition would develop over a limited
number of related and follow-on innovations, leading to tremendous waste of
resources.172 When a new area is opened up after a pioneering discovery, it would be
more efficient to have one party manage and coordinate the subsequent developments.173
Broad patents allow pioneering patentees – who are arguably best positioned given the
interests, foresight, and expertise pioneers must exhibit in making pioneering innovations
– to coordinate such developments.174
ii)

Why patent scope should closely track the enabled innovation

(a) Narrow patents better align patent incentives with technological needs
Incentives work best when they align with the goals they are to foster. Since patents are
to incentivize technological innovations, the patent landscape, which defines the
incentives available to promote innovations, should match the technological landscape
and the needs of the technological community.175 A problem with broad patents is that
they do not match the technological landscape. By over-recognizing what is invented,
broad patents over-incentivise R&D activities176 in the immediate timeframe – spurring
risky ill-advised research177 and unproductive R&D races178 and siphoning off scarce
resources from other socially valuable endeavors179 – and under-incentivise in the later
timescale – by prematurely removing legal rights to inventions that have not really been
made.180 The patent frenzy in biotechnology today may symptomatic of just such overincentivization.181 As patent rights are awarded faster than innovations are actually
developed, as gaps develop between the legal and technological understanding of
innovations, the effectiveness of patents to incentivize innovations decreases.182
Similarly, gaps between the storehouse of actual technological knowledge and patent
library can also develop when the law awards narrow patents and under-recognizes
innovations. Under-recognization occurs when the law recognizes less than what is
actually invented. Over-incentivization inevitably follows under-recognization because
when a previous innovation is under-recognized, the unrecognized parts of the
innovations are attributed to subsequent innovators even though earlier innovators might
have already made them.183 Either over or under-recognization is counterproductive for
the inventive process because either produces gaps, which undermine the effectiveness of
patents to incentivize actual innovations.
Limiting patent scope to the scope of the underlying technological innovation is a much
better way of incentivizing innovations because it strives to align the storehouse of actual
technological knowledge and patent library. Defining patent scope by the enabled
technology is also consistent with the quid pro quo of basic patent bargain, which
requires that in the exchange of patent monopoly of invention disclosure, the inventor
must give to the public the know-how to make use of the innovation in return for a patent
monopoly.184
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(b) Competition more effectively fosters innovations than central planning
Another advantage of limiting patent scope to the underlying innovation is that it is more
consistent with the free market basis of the Western economy. Kitch argued against the
use of competition for fostering follow-on innovations by emphasizing the downside of
competitive waste. Nevertheless, these “disadvantages” of competition must be viewed
against the benefits of competition.185 Given the baseline norm of free market and open
competition in Western (and increasingly the global) economies, competition rather than
central command should be preferred as a model for creating innovations.186
Currently, there is no definitive proof whether the benefits of competition trumps those of
of monoplies with respect to promoting innovations. But the dominant modern view
seems to be that the benefits of a competitive innovation market outweigh the benefits of
a monopolistic driven one.187 This view makes sense especially given the uncertainty of
innovations. If innovations are so uncertain, it is unrealistic to believe that entrusting the
innovation process to a few major innovators (by granting them broad patents) will help
to streamline innovations. Instead, it is probably better to keep patents narrowly tailored
so that innovations can continue to bubble spontaneously from various diverse sources.
Another benefit of narrow patents is that it tends to spread competition throughout the
innovation life cycle. This is beneficial given the observation that most technologies
today develop in multiple stages through an extended innovation life cycle. Innovations
come in chains. Rarely do inventions come as a one-shot deal. Spreading also helps to
spur innovation by increasing the number of stakeholders involved throughout the
innovation process, which, as discussed, take place in multiple stages.188 Another benefit
of narrow patents is that broad patents tend to concentrate incentives at one stage of
innovation – usually at a very early stage in the innovative cycle as parties race to stake
out major monopolies. By reducing the incentive to develop technologies during the
most speculative stages of an innovation life cycle, narrow patents help to reduce such
speculative wastes by spreading competition throughout the innovation lifecycle.189
(c) Broad patents over-incentivise R&D and merely shifts alleged competitive
wastes over follow-on developments to early stages
One of the main benefits Kitch touted for broad patents is the reduction of competition.
However, with closer analysis, it seems that broad patents may not so much reduce
competitive waste190 as shift the competitive wastes to earlier stages of the innovation
process.191 As discussed above, with narrow patents, competition is spread through out
the innovation process. When patent scope is increased, raising the stake of an early
legal win,192 overall competition is not eliminated so much as overall competition
become focused toward the earlier stages as inventors race to patent in anticipation of
cornering a monopoly. Broad patents would thus most likely simply induce inventors to
redeploy to earlier rounds resources they would have otherwise spent in later rounds,
resulting in no net decrease in competitive waste.
(d) Coordination lacks empirical evidence
The evidence for coordination is also lacking. If coordination were important to
pioneers, one would expect pioneers to target issue licenses to subsequent innovators. On
the contrary, Merges & Nelson recently found that pioneers rarely grant targeted licenses;
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instead the norm is to grant broad, general licenses.193 Coordination also suffers
conceptually given the uncertain trajectory of scientific innovations.194 Given the
difficulty in foreseeing the impacts of technological breakthroughs,195 it would not seem
to make sense to designate one party to coordinate follow-on innovations. In
circumstances of true uncertainty, progress is best developed through vigorous
competition among multiple well-qualified, well-incentivized parties (rather than the
designation of a false sage) throughout the all phases of innovations.
iii)

The relevance of technological field

The cost-benefit analysis has been discussed thus far independently of any insight into
technological or market characteristics of industries.196 Recent studies suggest however
that the technological and economical context of the innovations should be taken into
account in assessing the costs and benefits of patents.197 Merges and Nelson abstracted
three categories of innovation patterns under which patent scope should be evaluated and
to which patent doctrines should be tailored. The three categories are fields with: 1.)
independent spheres of inventions; 2.) mutually dependent, cumulative spheres of
inventions; and 3.) science-based (breakthrough) inventions that opens up many followon innovations.198
(a) Field with independent spheres of inventions
Fields with independent spheres of innovation, or “discrete innovations,” involve
industries where innovations take place relatively independently of each other. In such
industries, the original pioneer either develops all the related technologies together or is
expected to undertake most of the follow-on and related developments of the
innovation.199 Examples include the traditional pharmaceutical and chemicals
industries.200 Once a drug is developed, for example, the innovation is complete and
stands on its own. There are usually little follow-on innovations, but even if there are,
the original pioneers undertake most of those developments.201 In such environments, the
cost of overly broad patents – the chance for patents to disincentivize others from
innovating – is low, and broad patents can usually be awarded without too much harm.202
(b) Fields with mutually dependent, cumulative spheres of inventions
Fields with mutually dependent, cumulative spheres of inventions involve industries
where technology develops cumulatively and incrementally, often with lots of mutual
dependence. The communications and semi-conductors industry represent prototypical
industries. A state-of-the-art microprocessor, for example, can feature a ground breaking
proprietary technology but yet, without depending also on a wide diversity of prior,
cumulative innovations, the chip would not be able to function.203 In such an
environment, any incentive to holdout and rent seek204 against other inventors is muted.
When innovators fall on both sides of the rent seeking fight, they quickly learn to be
more amenable in sharing their technologies,205 lowering transaction costs related to IP
for the entire industry.206 As an observer recently noted, in cumulative industries,
“patents are usually legal bargaining chips [for cross-licensing] rather than the traditional
prize for winning a technology tournament [to blocking out a market].”207 The cost of
overly broad patents in cumulative, incremental industries is thus, like that of
independent spheres industries, manageable.208
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(c) Fields with science-based (breakthrough-based) inventions
Fields with science-based inventions involve industries where scientific or technological
breakthroughs open up large areas of new opportunities for subsequent developments.209
Recent examples include the biotechnological and superconductivity industries.210 The
cost of overly broad patents is very high in science-based industries.211 Unlike industries
with independent spheres of innovations, many competitors usually participate in the
effort to develop follow-on technologies.212 The potential for broad patents to block
subsequent innovations is high because many subsequent innovations will be expected to
build upon prior breakthroughs.213 However, unlike the case in cumulative, mutually
independent industries, because the IP dependencies among stakeholders in science-based
industries are asymmetric,214 the incentive to ameliorate the problem of transaction cost is
not high.215 It is thus very important to try to get the scope of patent right in sciencebased industries.216
iv)

Historical lessons on proper patent scope

Scholars have debated the question of appropriate patent scope for centuries.217 Even
basic questions such as to what extent the patent system is actually incentivizing
innovations remain unsettled. 218 After studying a few seminal cases of broad patents and
their effects on subsequent technological progress, Merges and Nelson recently offered
some qualitative insights regarding proper patent scope.219 A key observation is that in
industries where the development of follow-on technologies is resource intensive or
technologically uncertain, patent scope over the pioneering technology should be
narrowly tailored to ensure that patent incentives and competition are preserved for
subsequent phases of innovations.220 Merges and Nelson have also noticed that history
offers many examples where broad patents have led to impediments of follow-on
developments but few if any example where broad patents have facilitated the
development of follow-on innovations.221
VII) An incentive-based case against applying the natural extracts
doctrine in biotechnology
As has just been discussed, the purpose of intellectual property protection is to “promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” And as has just been argued, in order for legal
incentives to effectively incentivize technological progress, the legal incentives must be
congruent with technological needs. What the patent system recognizes as invented must
have been recognized as such by the technological community; and conversely, what the
technological community recognize as still needing work must be recognized by the
patent system as still needing work and not be prematurely recognized.
The problem with the natural extracts doctrine is by setting the level at which innovations
are evaluated at too high a level of granularity, it produces overly broad patents that
distorts patent incentives. As the patent archive grow disproportionately with real
technological progress, the effectiveness of patent incentives to incentivize innovation
inevitably weakens.222 In the section above, “The natural extracts doctrine codifies
outdated science and produces systematically overly broad patents,” I theorized that this
unfortunate result arose from the courts’ misinformed application of old patent doctrines
to new technological landscapes. By evaluating technologies at too high a level of
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granularity and force fitting of legal doctrines to new technologies without sufficient
appreciation of the new technological landscapes, courts have sometimes eveolved patent
law to a stage where it potentially risks impeding future innovation. The following
section briefly discusses some of the key themes discussed above to the context of the
biotech industry.
A) If patents are to incentivize scientific and technological innovations,
patent incentives must align with technological needs
i)

Incentivizing technological innovations at every stage of innovations

If patents are to incentivize technological innovations, patent incentives must align with
technological needs.223 Any gap that develops between legal and technological
understandings would decrease the effectiveness of patents to incentivize technological
progress.224 This is especially true in industries that depend on multi-round innovations
such as biotech. A cure for a disease like cancer, for example, will require breakthroughs
through several rounds of innovations.225 A break in any link of the chain of innovations
will greatly affect the overall progress of the entire field.226 If patents are to incentivize
overall progress and not break the chain of innovations, patents must be narrowly tailored
so patent incentives can be preserved to incentivize innovations every each successive
round.227 Broad patents should be avoided because they tend to focus over-narrowly on
certain rounds (i.e., usually the earlier rounds) at the expense of subsequent rounds.
ii)

Reducing the high cost of blocking patents in a multi-round
innovations

Besides prematurely removing incentives from subsequent rounds of innovations, broad
patents can also directly impede subsequent innovations by creating blocking patents.228
The Scripps and Amgen cases showcased how serious a threat this can be. While
blocking patents in a world without transaction costs may actually serve to incentivize
innovations by enabling inventors to more fully internalize the benefits of their creations,
in reality, transaction costs cannot be ignored in reality. As the Scripps and Amgen cases
showed, the cost of blocking patents to impede innovation is great. Worse still, as bad as
the Scripps and Amgen cases seemed, the adverse consequences of overly broad patents
in the genetic context will be orders of magnitude worse. Scripps and Amgen involve
purified compounds – subjects that are traditionally associated with independent spheres
of innovation.229 Genetic patents will touch upon subject matter in a much broader area
of biology.230 Genes are the basic building code of life. Should patents genes ever block,
entire fields of research in medicine, pharmaceuticals, and basic biology will suffer.
While the effects of blocking patents can be somewhat alleviated in some industries
featuring mutual dependence of innovations,231 this is unlikely to happen in the case of
genes given the asymmetric dependence of biotechnological innovations.232 Because the
role of research and applications are more delineated among participants in biotech, the
motivation to create pools and cross licenses that lessen the adverse effects of patent
blocking will be correspondingly lower. Given the dramatically super high costs of
blocking patents in biotech, it is especially critical to take steps that decrease the cost of
blocking patents in multi-round industries such as biotech. An important place to start is
to scrutinize the scope of biotech patents to ensure they are not unnecessarily broad.
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iii)

Re-emphasizing the traditional scientific over the modern patent
based incentives

Broad patents are sometimes justified on the ground that patent incentives are needed to
compensate for extra-technological factors such as market, regulatory, and enforcement
risks.233 Pharmaceutical product patents, now required throughout the world as part of
the WTO TRIPs agreement,234 are justified on the ground of the tremendous resources
need to be expended to test and validate a drug target. Such patents exist to deal with not
just technological but also market risks. It is emphasized that even after making the
scientific and technological innovations involved in identifying a drug candidate,235
pharmaceutical companies must be further incentivized, with a broad product patent, to
expend resources to push the drug through the FDA and to develop the market. While
patents have been broadened to compensate for such extra-technological factors in
pharmaceutical industries,236 such practices should be limited rather than expended.
In particular, patents must not be so used in the broader science-based biotech industries
– for at least two reasons. First, since the development of science is of core importance,
patents should focus on incentivizing scientific and technological innovations, not
overcoming regulatory or market hurdles. Patent is already blunt enough of an
instrument to regulate just incentives of innovation, its use to regulate also incentives of
marketplace adversely strains the system. The risk of such practices to distort innovation
incentives is too great. If industries need help to overcome extra-technological hurdles,
separate frameworks outside of patents should be employed. Perhaps tax subsidies can
be offered.
Second, as seen above, while too much patent incentives can impede technological
progress by incentivizing patent races and blocking patents, it is not clear whether too
little patent incentives will cause equally as much harm. Some have argued that in
science-based industries, patents need not be made the pillar of an industrial policy to
promote progress. The existence of non-patent incentives237 such as traditional sciencebased incentives238 may already go a long way toward incentivizing much of scientific
and technological innovations in biotech. Indeed, some recent studies have shown that
many research-intensive industries do not rely as heavily on intellectual property
protection to incentivize R&D as commonly believed.239 Given the fact that the cost of
broad patents is high (i.e. broad patents can block subsequent innovations)240 and narrow
patents low (i.e. extra-patent, science-based incentives exist to make up for potential
incentive deficiencies) in science-based industries, it should be wise policy to err on the
narrow patents where data is not justify the strength patents. In biotech, it would
probably be wise to select the overly narrow patents instead of the overly broad ones
produced in science-based industries.
B) Because technological directions are difficult to predict, competition
should be preferred over central coordination
As discussed above, the economy of this country is based on a competitive rather than a
central command system.241 It should thus not be hard to argue that given that base line,
innovations should be fostered by competition rather than central command where
possible.242 In truly uncertain environments, where technological trajectories are truly
difficult to predict, patent incentives should thus be made minimum. It does not make
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sense to designate a party to manage follow-on innovation activities when no one party,
including the original pioneer, is in any better position to foresee the future trajectories of
a new technology.243 Where the expertise needed to make related innovations is broad244
and the risks and investments involved in each round of innovations245 is great, and
where innovation bubbles more by happenstance than through heavy investment, narrow
or even overly narrow patents should be preferred to preserve competition for latter
stages of innovation.
In biotech, where it is not possible to predict which round of innovations will be most
important (if there is such a round), it is paramount to distribute competition through all
phases of innovations rather than too early in the cycle of innovation.246 Since narrow
patents tend to distribute competition throughout the innovation life cycle while broad
patents tend to concentrate competition early in the innovation life cycle,247 a doctrine
such as the natural extracts doctrine that prescribes categorically broad patents must be
abandoned.
C) Incentives of original pioneers
One of the alleged benefits of broad patents is that, by allowing pioneers to internalize
some of the benefits of follow-on innovations, broad patents more completely incentivize
pioneers for their original innovation.248 Further examining will show that this is a
dubious proposition in science-based industries where follow-on developments are so
unpredictable. While pioneers may indeed factor internalization of potential follow-on
benefits into their original incentives to innovate, pioneers probably would not do so in
unpredictable, science-based industries given how difficult249 technological trajectories
are to predict.250 Many innovations start out innocuous only to make a large impact later;
many hyped innovations turn out not to make much impact at all.251 In such
circumstances, pioneers more likely will base their decision to innovate on the benefits
they expect to derive from their immediate invention rather than any potential follow-on
benefits. Hence it is not necessary to risk broadening patent scope to try to better
incentivize inventors when inventors do not take into account such incentives in making
innovations.
VIII)

Conclusion

This paper has highlighted the utilitarian basis on which patent law is founded and
suggested that a policy aimed at promoting progress rather than perhaps preserving
property doctrines ought to be the basis of patent law. As science and technology play
ever-increasing roles in societal welfare, a well designed patent policy has a potential to
play important roles in increasing our well being by incentiving long-term technological
progress. To incentivize such progress, the law must pay more attention to realities
demanded by new landscapes rather simply perpetuating old doctrinal principles.
Reforms must be advanced that narrow patents are promulgated to ensure that patent
incentives better align better with technological realities than allowed under today’s
broad patent system.
The natural extracts doctrine has played a defining role in opening the biotechnology
patent floodgate by broadly delineating the scope of “artificial manufacture.”
Unfortunately, it has done so by de-emphasizing the contribution an innovation makes to
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the state of the art and emphasizing the effect an innovation bestows to society. By
creating a legal, constructive delineation of what is natural and artificial, it has effectively
eviscerated the subject matter restrictions against nature and has been greatly responsible
for the current floodtide and crisis of patents in biotech.252 Given the importance of
technological innovation in biotechnology and the stakes involved in having a healthy
biotechnological industry, it is important that patent reform in this sector be carried out as
soon as possible. Because biotechnology innovations take place in multiple, successive
steps, patent scope must be made to match the underlying innovations. Categorically
broad patents that ignore the underlying technological contributions to the state of the art
and mistaken, for example, process for product innovations must be eliminated. Overly
broad patents incentivize today’s innovations at the expense future innovations.
There are alternative, more effective ways to incentivize biotech innovations without
sacrificing future innovations. In the pharmaceutical context, for example, where the
innovations typically involve a combination of process and use innovations,253 the
inventions should be adequately incentivized by a combination of process and use
patents. Similarly, in the biotech genomic context, where the advances typically involve
discoveries over the use and application (and not creation) of genes for diagnostic and
therapeutic purposes254 – and not the sequencing255 or basic discovery256 of genes –
genomic innovations should be incentivized257 by use rather than product patents.258
To reverse the damage and legal confusion that decades of application of natural extracts
doctrine have produced, the subject matter restriction must be resuscitated through a
more informed understanding of the underlying technological innovations involved. A
subject matter delimitation of what is nature and what is not, as understood under a
PHOSITA standard similar to that used for obviousness and enablement, is a good first
step. If the incentivization of innovational progress is important, the natural extracts
doctrine, together with the overly broad patents the doctrine has promulgated, must be
promptly abandoned.
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Parke-Davis, 189 F. 95 at 103 (asserting that “even if [the adrenaline] were merely an extracted product
without change … [and thus merely] a purification of the principle, it became for every practical purpose a
new thing commercially and herapeutically. That was a good ground for a patent.’’)
57
This is problematic because by treating science as a black box, innovations are be easily mischaracterized
(and overly broadly so). At high a level of granularity, all science and technological seem magical. See
discussions surrounding infra notes 115-124.
58
See Id. (“The line … is to be drawn … from the common usages of men [rather] than from nice
considerations of dialectic.”)
59
Id. at 103.
60
In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1032, 1035 (CCPA 1977).
61
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10.
62
In Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co, the district court held that the DNA claims at issue could
not have been directed toward the “DNA sequence encoding human EPO since that is a nonpatentable
natural phenomenon ‘free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’” Instead, the invention must have
been directed toward underlying genetic compounds, “the ‘purified and isolated’ DNA sequence encoding
erythropoietin.” Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1959 (D. Mass.
1990). See also “Utility Examination Guidelines,” supra 63, at 1095 (explaining that “[a] DNA sequence is
not patentable because a sequence is merely descriptive information about a molecule.”).
63
The Federal Circuit view genes as “a chemical compound, albeit a complex one….” Amgen Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The U.S. P.T.O. has pronounced that while “a
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DNA sequence itself is not patentable … [a] purified DNA molecule isolated from its natural environment,
on the other hand, is a chemical compound and [may be] patentable.” Utility Examination Guidelines, 66
Fed. Reg. 1092, 1094 (Jan. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/utilexmguide.pdf.
64
According to the U.S.P.T.O., a gene is patentable if there is “a specific, substantial, and credible utility
for the claimed isolated and purified gene.” “Utility Examination Guidelines,” supra 63, at 1093.
According to the PTO, “the utility of a claimed DNA does not necessarily depend on the function of the
encoded gene product. A claimed DNA may have a specific and substantial utility because, e.g., it
hybridizes near a disease-associated gene or it has a gene-regulating activity.” Id. At 1095.
65
According to the PTO, “an inventor’s discovery of a gene can be the basis for a patent [so long as it has
been] isolated from its natural state and processed through purifying steps. … An isolated and purified
DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is eligible for a patent because …
an excised gene … [purified] DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature…. Patenting
compositions or compounds isolated from nature follows well established principles….” “Utility
Examination Guidelines,” supra 63, at 1093.
66
See Eisenberg, supra note 29, at 786-87, 788-89 (suggesting that the primary motive to patenting genetic
materials is for control over the information coded by the molecules); Jackson, note 9, at 11 n. 13
(explaining that “genes are expressions of information, but … the information contained in them is
essentially a work of nature (and is valuable mainly because it is broadly found in nature)….”). The
reduction of DNA patents into chemical patents is reminiscent of the early practice by which software
patents were reduced into specialized hardware patents. See, e.g., In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916 (C.C.P.A.
1982) (cautiously allowing a software patent on the ground that it was less an abstract algorithm than a set
of instructions to control the hardware functions of a computer system). See also, Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 186-87 (1981)(allowing software patent and distinguishing patent of software as part of complex
industrial process from software that produced simple numerical values, which was not allowed).
67
See Eisenberg, supra 29, at 786-87.
68
The scope of today’s genetic patents are very broad. In denying the suggestion “that DNA patent claim
scope should be limited to uses that are disclosed in the patent application,” the PTO emphasized, “[a]
patent on a composition gives exclusive rights to the composition for a limited time, even if the inventor
disclosed only a single use for the composition.” “Utility Examination Guidelines,” supra 63, at 1095.
69
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (U.S. 1980). The USPTO announcement in 1987 that nonnaturally occurring nonhuman multicellular living organisms were patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. 101. Patent & Trademark Office: Nonnaturally Occurring Non-Human Animals Are Patentable
Under 101, 33 Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 664 (1986).
70
See supra note 64 and 65.
71
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, The Law, Technology & the Arts Symposium: The Past, Present
and Future of the Federal Circuit, BIOTECHNOLOGY'S UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE, 54 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 691, 695-96 (2004).
72
Conflicts in Federal Circuit Patent Law Decisions, 11 Fed. Circuit B.J. 723, 723-34 (2002). See also,
Duane M. Linstrom, “Spontaneous Mutation: A Sudden Change in the Evolution of the Written Description
Requirement as It Applies to Genetic Patents,” 40 San Diego L. Rev. 947, 969-70 (2003) (lamenting that
“[t]he latest Enzo decision has clarified some issues, but ultimately leaves the 112 written description
requirement for genetic patents in a continued state of uncertainty.”)
73
Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 63, 1092-97 (comments 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 16, and 19).
According to the P.T.O., “[i]f a patent application discloses only nucleic acid molecular structure for a
newly discovered gene, and no utility for the claimed isolated gene, the claimed invention is not patentable.
… [However,] where the application discloses a specific, substantial, and credible utility for the claimed
isolated and purified gene, the isolated and purified gene composition may be patentable.” Utility
Examination Guidelines, supra note 63, at 1093.
74
See Id. at 536 (“‘(A) patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather than to the realm of
philosophy....’”).
75
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (i.e. an invention where “specific benefit exists in
currently available form.”)
76
Id. at 521-22, 531-32.
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77

Id. at 534 (The court expressed its concern that patents over early stage technologies would “confer
power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public.”).
78
Id. at 536.
79
Id. at 536.
80
See 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Mueller, supra note 49, at 161 (discussing how the Federal Circuit has
given little attention to Manson and has in fact lowered the bar back toward the more lenient pre-Manson
“practical utility” standards). See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 306. See also, In re Brana, 51
F.3d 1560, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (clashing with the U.S.P.T.O. over whether the threshold of utility for
compounds required FDA approval for clinical trials).
81
With the ever-decreasing time between research and commercialization and the constantly eroding the
distinction between fundamental and applied research, the use of a utility as a subject matter gatekeeper has
been deemed even less useful.
82
See Mueller, supra note 49, at ??
83
35 U.S.C. § 112.
84
See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (affirming that “[t]he basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by
the public from an invention with substantial utility.”); Mueller, supra note 49, at 65.
85
See, e.g., In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d at 502 (Enablement requires that “the scope of enablement provided
to one of ordinary skill in the art by the disclosure is such as to be commensurate with the scope of
protection sought by the claims.”); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (CCPA 1970) (“35 U.S.C. §112 …
requires that the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided
by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.”). To further define what constitutes enablement,
the courts have constructed an “undue experimentation” standard: the disclosure must enable a person of
average skills in the art to practice the invention without “undue experimentation.” See In re Wands, 858
F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The application of the “undue experimentation” standard is fact-specific
and can turn on a variety of factors such as how “predictable” or “unpredictable” a technology is. See In re
Fisher, 427 F.2d at 839.
86
See, e.g., Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 11, at 38 (“The requirement of an enabling disclosure … is
justified as a means of ensuring that the public receives its quid pro quo for the patent monopoly.”);
Mueller, supra note 49, at 66 (“The disclosure requirements … effectively implement the quid pro quo of
the patent system.”); In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502 (CCPA 1976) (“What is of maximum concern … is
whether that disclosure contains sufficient teaching regarding the subject matter of the claims as to enable
one skilled in the pertinent art to make and to use the claimed invention.”).
87
Here are a few illustrative cases of how the courts have applied the enablement requirement. In the
famous early case of The Incandescent Lamp Patent, the Supreme Court invalided Sawyer and Mann’s
broad claim over the use of fibrous or textile materials for making incandescent lighting on grounds of
enablement. The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465 (1895). The Court held that public was not
placed “in possession” of the invention because the patent did not detail the specific combination of the
materials feasibly needed to make lighting filaments. It would take the later genius and patience of
inventors like Edison to accomplish that. Incandescent Lamp, at 474. In another classic case O'Reilly v.
Morse, the Supreme Court invalidated Morse’s claim for all methods of communicating at a distance over
electromagnetic waves. O’Reilly, at 120. Among the requested claims is a claim on “the use of the motive
power of … electro-magnetism, however developed[,] for making or printing intelligible characters at any
distance.” Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 323. While Morse’s invention laid the foundation to all
sorts of electromagnetic communications, the court held that Morse had only actually demonstrated one of
many such methods of applying such communications. O’Reilly Id. In a more recent case, the Federal
Circuit struck down a patent’s broad claims over a biotechnology method involving “antisense” to control
the expression of individual genes. Antisense technology is a powerful biotechnology method for
controlling gene expression involving complementary DNA sequences. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene,
Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The patentee had broadly claimed the application of the
technology in eukaryotic and prokaryotic cells even though he was successful in applying the technology to
a few cell types. Id. At 1372-3. The patent could not be allowed since the “amount of experimentation
required to adapt the practice [in reality] … was quite high.” Id., at 1372-73.
88
The Supreme Court pronounced in Chakrabarty that “anything under the sun that is made by man”
(italized added for emphasis) is patentable. Chakrabarty, however, does not explain the post-Charabarty
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biotech patenting explosion since it does not define precisely what is meant for something to be “made” by
man. The holding of the Court was merely that microorganisms should not be disqualified as patentable
subject matter merely by fact of being living organisms as Congress had intended “anything under the sun
that is made by man” to be patentable. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (U.S. 1980). It is
the liberal notion of human “manufacture” given by the natural extracts doctrine that is ultimately
responsible for the post-Chakrabarty patent floodgate. See discussions surrounding supra notes 55-61.
89
See, e.g., Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Traditionally, the
requirement has been invoked in the context of “time gap” situations such as those involving amendment of
claims, the claiming of benefit of another patent application, and interference proceedings. Mueller, supra
note 49, at 88. For example, whenever changes are made both to the specification and claims of an
application, the PTO must reconsider the priority date of each of the claims in light of the history in which
new information has been added to the application. The priority date of a claim is the day the PTO is
convinced the inventor came “in possession” of the idea expressed. The written descriptions requirement
provided PTO a framework to determine when inventor came “in possession” of the each of the ideas
expressed. See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 49, at 83-84; Gene-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d, at 977-79;Enzo Biochem
v. Gene-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting) quoting In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d
257, 191 (CCPA 1976) (“The function of the description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had
possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by
him.”); Mueller, supra note 49, at 84 (“[T]he written description of the invention requirement mandates
that the inventor must have been ‘in posession’ of the claimed invention as of a particular date….”);
Eisenberg & Merges, supra note 11, at 44-45 (Under the written description requirement, “the applicant
must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or
she was in possession of the invention.”).
90
Regents of UC and Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Enablement not
withstanding, the patentee must also have disclosed “information … pertaining to [the] cDNA's relevant
structural or physical characteristics,” the enabled disclosure of a “process for obtaining human insulinencoding cDNA” notwithstanding. Id.
91
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 927 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent disclosed a
method to identify certain non-steroidal anti-inflammatory compounds that did away with the
gastrointestinal side effects (e.g., stomach upset, irritation, ulcers, and bleeding) commonly associated with
traditional drugs such as aspirin, ibuprofen, ketoprofen, and naproxen. Id., at 917-918, 929-930. (Fed. Cir.
2004).
92
See Enzo v. Gene-Probe, 323 F.3d 956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that “‘[t]he purpose of the
'written description' requirement is broader than to merely explain how to 'make and use'; the applicant
must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or
she was in possession of the invention.’” Even then, the traditional “purpose of the ‘written description’ [to
ensure that the patentee is] … in possession of the invention … merely states a purpose of the written
description requirement…. It does not state that possession alone is always sufficient to meet that
requirement.” In fact, “[a] showing of ‘possession’ is ancillary to the statutory mandate that ‘[t]he
specification shall contain a written description of the invention,’ and that requirement is not met if, despite
a showing of possession, the specification does not adequately describe the claimed invention.”).
93
See, also, Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d, at 1566, quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed Cir 1993)
(An adequate written description of genetic material “‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure,
formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed
chemical invention.”).
94
Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also
Conflicts in Federal Circuit Patent Law Decisions, supra note 72, at 732.
95
Enzo Biochem v. Gene-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 971-72 (Fed. Cir. 2002). It is not clear to the author
why the Federal Circuit must create an heightened written specifications requirement to address the issue of
overly broad claims. 35 U.S.C. §112 already stipulates that each patent “shall conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.” If one has already “particularly point[ed] out and distinctly claim[ed]” the as to enable one
skilled in the arts to understand the metes and bounds of an invention, why must additional requirements be
prescribed to satisfy a judge, jury, or even an inevitably biased expert witness? Since claims are to be
interpreted from the perspective of a hypothetical person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA), there
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is no reason why the written specifications should not. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 2005 WL 1620331, *5
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that claim terms are constructed according to “meaning that the term would have
to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing
date of the patent application.”); Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(noting that “our precedent is well-settled that a court will typically limit its inquiry to the way one of skill
in the art would interpret the claims in view of the written description portion of the specification.”);
Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “[a]
decision on whether a claim is invalid under § 112 requires a determination of whether those skilled in the
art would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.”); Mueller, supra
note 49, at 41.
96
Id. at 975, quoting In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n. 1 (1971). It is unclear to the author why the
court is concerned about an inventor not actually reducing to practice C when he had already enabled one
skilled in the art to do so. The court has never required a subject matter to be actually reduced in order to
be patentable. “To serve as constructive reduction to practice, the disclosure of the subject matter … must
meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph … [, which stipulates that t]he specification shall
contain a written description … in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art … to make and use the same….” Bigham v. Godtfredsen 857 F.2d 1415, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See, also, e.g., Elan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Mayo Foundation for Medical Educ. and Research, 346 F.3d
1051, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that though the “disclosure in an assertedly anticipating reference
must be adequate to enable possession of the desired subject matter … [by] the public … [i]t is not,
however, necessary that an invention disclosed in a publication shall have actually been made….”).
97
See at Enzo Biochem v. Gene-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 974 (Fed. Cir. 2002)(“Perhaps there is little
difference in electrical and mechanical inventions between describing an invention and enabling one to
make and use it, but that is not true of chemical and chemical-like inventions.”).
98
Id.
99
See, e.g., Scott A. Chambers, “Written Description” and Patent Examination Under the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office Guidelines, IP LITIGATOR, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 9-10 (“Thus, the Federal Circuit's present
interpretation of the written description requirement maintains the vitality of the U.S. patent system and
provides disclosures that others can build on. By suggesting that disclosure of the structure or actual
sequence of complex chemical entities may sometimes be required, the Federal Circuit may have advanced
the goal of the patent system to actually put the claimed invention into the hands of the public.”); Margaret
Sampson, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112
in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1260-61 (2000) (“Without a heightened
written description requirement, inventors could receive patent rights to sequences of which they have no
knowledge, in organisms with which they have never worked.... Therefore, the Federal Circuit's approach
to the written description requirement in the area of biotechnology has prevented nucleotide sequence
claims from becoming a Pandora's box that the patent law is unable to control.”).
100
See, e.g., Mueller, Janice M., The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 617 (1998) (“The Lilly decision establishes
uniquely rigorous rules for the description of biotechnological subject matter that significantly contort
written description doctrine away from its historic origins and policy grounding. The Lilly court elevate[s]
written description to an effective ‘super enablement’ standard.... [This] will likely chill development.”);
Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the ‘Written Description’ Requirement (and
Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 55, 60, 70, 83 (2000) (“[T]he written
description requirement is a threat to the coherence of disclosure doctrines….” “Today … the written
description requirement enjoys a prominence wholly out of proportion to its humble origins. … Recent
efforts to elaborate the ‘possession’ standard both confirm the substantial redundancy of the enablement
and written description requirements and illustrate the capacity of the written description requirement to
serve as a tool for judicial improvisation.”).
101
See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495-96 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (In assessing enablement, where claims
involve “pioneering,” “unpredictable” technologies, “the required level of disclosure will be greater than,
for example, the disclosure of an invention involving a ‘predictable’ factor such as a mechanical or
electrical element.”); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1375 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (In
assessing enabelment and “[i]n view of the rapid advances in science, we recognize that what may be
unpredictable at one point in time may become predictable at a later time.”); See Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d
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(Raider dissent), at 982, (“Beyond mere adequacy of disclosure, [enablement] serves as the line of
demarcation between the visionary theorist (adds nothing to the useful arts) and the visionary pioneer
(contributes to the useful arts [citations omitted] and also serves to limit claim scope thus demarking the
boundary between pioneer inventions and patentable improvements. [citations omitted] The WD [written
descriptions] possession test cannot perform these functions.”)
102
History is full of examples where inventors did not originally appreciate the full scope and value of their
innovations. In fact, this is one of the benefits of patents: to incentivize disclosure of inventions so their
values can be maximized. The original lack of appreciations by the inventors does not by itself limit the
contributions actually made to the field (i.e. enabled) and has traditionally not limited the credit attributed
to the inventor. Note the “Best Mode” requirement requires a patentee to disclose the envisioned context in
which the invention is to be used. The impetus behind this requirement is to improve the quality of the
disclosure not to limit the scope of patent.
103
“[T]he Supreme Court repeatedly cautioned against the disruption of the settled expectations of the
inventing community.” Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d (Raider dissent), at 982. “The responsibility for changing
[settled law] rests with Congress.... Fundamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate
expectations of inventors in their property.” Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.,
535 U.S. 722, 739.
104
See Janis, supra note 100.
105
An independent requirement raises costs of patent transaction by imposing new additional requirements.
The court should also more carefully consider such effects on small entities that can ill afford arbitrary
though small rises in patent costs. See, e.g., Gene-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d at 983 (Raider dissent) (The
“Lilly/Enzo rule prejudices university or small inventors who do not have the expensive and timeconsuming resources to process every new biotechnological invention to extract its nucleotide sequence.”);
Jackson, note 9, at 21-22 (voicing concerns that patent transaction costs in general disproportionately hurt
small entities). In addition, the court should also carefully consider the impact heightened transaction costs
on the general incentive to innovate. See Margaret Sampson, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written
Description Requirements Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
1233, 1262 (2000) (“The primary argument against the Federal Circuit's heightened written description
requirement for biotechnological invention is that ... it also ‘reduces incentives to invest in innovation by
depriving potential patentees of the opportunity to fully benefit from their research.’”).
106
See discussion surrounding supra notes 54-61.
107
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948). In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (CCPA
1977).
108
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-10.
109
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
110
Id. at 131.
111
Id. at 130.
112
For more discussion on appropriate level at which technology should be evaluated, see discussion infra
“Evaluation of properties at end user, macroscopic level codifies outdated science.”
113
Just as the innovation in Funk was not patentable because it involved only a reshuffling of naturally
occurring bacteria, the innovation in Chakrabarty would have been unpatentable because it involved
merely a reshuffling of naturally occurring genes.
114
Note that even if no new manufacture is created, the innovation is still valuable and can still be
protected. A use patent could issue on use of a gene transgenic to confer a specific property to a specific
bacteria species.
115
Cf. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM.
L.REV. 839, 884 (1990) (Urging careful scrutiny over patent scope, especially where great excitement over
“new scientific and technological developments” exists, lest monopoly is conferred over an “invention
[that] may diverge from ‘prior art,’ in the sense of actual technological accomplishments, and sweep the
market, yet still be only a successful application of knowledge that is apparent to the scientifically
sophisticated.”).
116
See discussion surrounding infra notes 175-180, and 228.
117
Physics, for example, started out as a study of macro phenomenon, but as the field matured, the thrust of
it moved to ever-smaller scales. Biology, too, has similarly moved from studying macro phenomenon to
studying micro and then molecular phenomena.
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See discussions surrounding infra notes 123, 225, and Error! Bookmark not defined..
Novelty, obviousness, enablement would still need to evaluated separately.
120
See discussion surround supra note 113.
121
Titanium Metal Corp v. Banner, Fed. Cir, 1985.
122
The definition of alloys is after all “a substance composed of two or more metals.” Webster’s third new
international dictionary of the English language, unabridged (Springfield, Mass., Merriam-Webster,
c1993).
123
As noted earlier, therapeutic and diagnostic applications often build on many innovations. See supra
note 15. To effectively incentivize progress, patents must incentivize each of these innovations. Because
many innovations do not make great impacts until combined with other subsequent innovations, patents
cannot simply evaluate innovations based on their impact (without disincentivizing these innovations
altogether). Rather, the law should evaluate innovations by their contribution to the state of the art instead.
Another problem with recognizing innovations by their effects rather than their technological contribution
is that the practice tends to over recognize innovations (and thus inevitably impeding future innovations.
See discussion surrounding infra note Error! Bookmark not defined.). Consider again the case the
vitamin deficiency blindness above (in note 15). If patents were to recognize innovations purely by their
impact, a patent would be broadly awarded to the person who first successfully uses genetically engineered
plants to cure vitamin deficiency induced blindness. However, such a patent would probably over
recognize the innovation because at a high enough level of granularity, say from the patient’s perspective,
the inventor would be credited with broadly inventing a cure to vitamin deficiency induced blindness when
all the inventor really did was invent one way of curing the disease. With such broad patents, others who
want to create alternative ways of curing the same disease would be blocked from doing so. See also supra
note 124.
124
See also infra note 123.
125
While PHOSITA is ultimately a judicially manufactured concept, the ideal of PHOSITA is grounded in
reality. As Kuhn has noted, scientific and technological fields develop through evolution of paradigms.
Thomas S. Kuhn, “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,” (3rd ed., University of Chicago Press, 1996)
(discussing how scientific paradigms drive the process of scientific advancements). The dominant
paradigm of each field will help inform what is worth pursuing and what the value of each advancement is.
Such dominant paradigms will form the conceptual basis of PHOSITA.
126
This is not such a radical proposition since courts have already traditionally appealed to the fictitious but
legally objective PHOSITA standards in other patentability analyses such as obviousness, enablement, and
infringement. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 71, at 709-13. It is noted that asking legally trained
professionals to evaluate science and technology accurately can be a difficult proposition. See Burk &
Lemley, supra note 71, at 714-16 (discussing how the Federal Circuit court has gotten the science wrong in
continuing to demand a higher stringent disclosure in biotechnology than in other fields); park Davis. at
115 (admitting to judge’s lack of competence in evaluating accurately technology related issues and
specifically urging reforms that would allow courts to “summon[] technical judges to whom technical
questions are submitted and who can intelligently pass upon the issues without blindly groping among
testimony upon matters wholly out of their ken.”). Addressing the problem of requiring the law to evaluate
technological innovations accurately, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
127
See supra notes 124, 123, and 166.
128
It is noted that treating different technologies according to different fields, as in metallurgy v.
biotechnology, can raise issues of arbitrage as patentee “forum shops” fields of applications to obtain the
best patent terms. The patentee may profess that a technology is to be used for one industry when in reality
it is used for another. While this may be a problem, it should be noted that patent law, while allegedly
uniform in principle, is already non-uniform in application. Burk & Lemley, supra note 138, at 1576-77.
Even in applying routine references to PHOSITA (person having ordinary skill in the art), the law already
implicitly takes into account the context of the field for which an innovation is to be used.
129
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 903 (concluding that arguments that equate process
innovations for product innovations are “not convincing.”).
130
Note this was the fundamental dispute in Amgen and Scripps. Had the patents in Amgen and Scripps
covered only the purification processes, the recombinant inventors would have been able to practice their
inventions without interference from the original extractors. Yet process patents would have aksi
incentivized the original analog inventors to make their pioneering process innovations because until the
118
119
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recombinant processes were developed, their processes would have been the only ones available to extract
the products.
131
Product patents might serve as workable proxies for process patents in certain contexts, particularly
where the potential of such patents to block future innovations is low. For example, if there is only one
process to extract and manufacture a purified product, the discoverer of that process may be entitled to a
product patent. Since product patents are much easier to enforce than process patents, awarding a product
patent as a proxy for process innovations make sense in circumstances where such patents would create
little blocking costs.
132
See, e.g., Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 97 (U.S. Court of Appeals 1911).
133
See also supra note 130.
134
The main challenge to purification is the isolation process, not the formation or stablization of the
purified product. The definition of the term “extraction” correctly implies that the product to be purified
already exists in nature. Once a product is identified to be the target of extraction, the ultimate product of
the purification is predetermined – by nature. The creative part of the innovation is directed at creating the
process to produce the product, not in designing a new product.
135
For a survey of non-utilitarian arguments supporting patents, see, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property
Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale
L.J. 1533 (1993) (presenting philosophical, non-economic perspectives, including those drawn from natural
rights, in support of protecting intellectual property).
136
U.S. Constitution, Art. I, sect. 8, cl. 8. Historical note: the term “Science” in the Constitution actually
referred only to copyrightable subject matter. It is the phrase “useful Arts” that correspond to the modern
notion of “technologies” and “industries.” See Mueller, supra note 49, at 27.
137
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966). See, also, Fed'l Trade Comm'n, supra note , at 877
(“The PTO functions as a steward of the public interest … to encourage invention, disclosure, and
commercial development.”).
138
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, “Policy Levers in Patent Law,” 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1576 (referring to
patents as “our primary policy tool to promote innovation, encourage the development of new technologies,
and increase the fund of human knowledge.”).
139
See generally, e.g., Robert Patrick Merges, Patent Law and Policy: Cases and Materials 1-13 (2d ed.
1997) (discussing general patent history and theory); Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property
From 1545 to 1787, 26 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 711 (1944) (tracing origins of Western patent law); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1017 (1989) (surveying various theories in support and critique of patents).
140
A public good is a good that is available to all and where the consumption by one person does not
reduce its consumption by another. In economic lingo, their fruits can be enjoyed nonrivalrously. See,
e.g., Landes and Posner, supra note 2, at 14. For an introduction to the economic consequences of
nonrivalrous goods, see Scotchmer supra note 4, at 34-39.
141
Note that imitation by itself should not be frowned. America is built on competition and the “[f]reedom
to imitate to copy, is a cornerstone of competition.” Landes and Posner, supra note 2, at 23. It is the effect
that externalization of benefit has on the innovation process that is of essence here.
142
Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 24, 294 (noting that the “conventional rationale for granting [IP legal
protection] is the difficulty that a producer may encounter in trying to recover his fixed costs of research
and development when the product or process that embodies a new invention is readily copiable.”); Burk &
Lemley, supra note 71, at 693 (observing that “[l]egal rights in inventions allow inventors to control and
profit from goods that are costly to produce, but which are virtually costless to reproduce or to appropriate
once they have been created.”). The amount by which an innovation suffers the “public good” problem
depends on a number of factors, including the ease by which inventions are copied, whether private or
public resources are expended, and market conditions that allow innovators to internalize benefits such as
high first mover advantage and barrier to entry. Innovations that are not easily copied do not pose a big
“public goods” problem because the difficulty of copying ensures that the amount of externalized benefit
would not be high. Innovations that the public sponsors, typically through the government, also do not
pose a major public good problem since the benefits of public domain technologies ideally accrues evenly
back to the taxpaying public. (Whether the taxpaying base would reap the awards equally or whether there
would be a net subsidy by one constituency for another is a separate issue.) Similarly, technologies in
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markets that offer high first mover advantage and barrier to entry also do not pose big problems because
those conditions minimize the amount of externalizationed benefit competitors could achieve.
143
Only innovations that would not have occurred or be greatly delayed but for patent protections should be
protected by patents. It makes no sense to issue patents for inventions that would have occurred even
without patents. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 22, 24. Alternatively, it also would not make
much sense to grant a patent in hopes of speeding up an innovation by say one day. This second scenario
describes approximately that of genetic patenting. It is probably not wise to use patents to incentivize
research where the cost of research is dropping so fast that innovations that the patents allegedly are to
incentivize are soon becoming mere routine discoveries. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 361
(explaining how “excessive investment by those seeking patent protection” become “most wasteful when
the cost of making the invention is falling rapidly over time … for then … the making of the invention
probably should be deferred.”).
144
Intellectual properties, through the mechanism of licensing, can actually promote competition by
shortening current innovation lifecycle and jump-starting future innovations. Scotchmer, supra note 4, at
162. In general, patent monopoly must not be confused with economic monopoly. See Fed'l Trade
Comm'n, supra note 186, at 863 “Patents do not necessarily confer monopoly power on their holders, and
most business conduct with respect to patents does not unreasonably restrain or serve to monopolize
markets.” Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 294-95 (observing that the purpose of patents is not just
to monpolize, but also to disclose knowledge so that others can be spurred to make further innovations);
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“The Patent Clause itself
reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle
competition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”); Fed'l Trade
Comm'n, supra note 186, at 867 (explaining that barring strong justifications to the contrary, a competitive
system should be preferred).
145
For a proof that disclosure accelerates progress – i.e. that two inventors each innovating independently
will lead to faster breakthroughs, where a breakthrough requires at least two sequential inventive steps –
see Scotchmer, note 4, at 254-55. See also O’Donoghue, T. 1998. “A Patentability Requirement for
Sequential Innovation.” RAND J. of Econ. 29:654-916.
146
See Jackson, supra note 9, at 7.
147
See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 9, at 7; Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 98; V. Denicolò, “Patent Races and
Optimal Patent Breath and Length,” J. of Ind. Econ. 44:249-265.
148
A classic study on the economic impacts of patents is Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent
System, Study No. 15, Subcomm. Pat. Trademark & Copyright, Jud. Comm., 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958).
Other leading works include: WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL, 15-32 (1973), and F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 379-99 (1970).
149
Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 869-70.
150
W. Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Economic Welfare, 3-15 (1969); Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1813, 1855-67 (1984); R. Gilbert & C. Shapiro, Optimal
Patent Length and Breadth, 21 Rand J. of Econ. 106 (1990).
151
Merges & Nelson, note 115, at 843; see also, Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 325 (explaining that
beyond the immediate cost benefits of patents, “[b]road patent protection has still another, and
fundamental, double-edged effect: it increases the return to the first inventor, which encourages invention,
but increases the cost of invention to his successors, which discourages invention.”). See also, Suzanne
Scotchmer, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,” 5 J. of Econ.
Per. 29 (1991).
152
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 843.
153
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
154
Note doctrinally, however, that patent law has never acknowledged the need to award an inventor for
inspiring the future, no matter how high an impact his insights might prove to be. Patent is to be awarded
only for enabled innovations, and Morse did not invent the radio and television. See, e.g.., Beck, The
Prospect Theory of the Patent System and Unproductive Competition, 5 Res. L. & Econ. 193 (1983)
(arguing that doctrinally, patent law does not protect future innovations enabled by a technology).
Nevertheless, telegraphy no also doubt facilitated later telecommunication innovations such as the radio
and television. Morse could have really envisioned and helped inspire others todevelop these subsequent
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innovations. See Scherer, note 9, at 1361-62 (observing that the enablement requirement allowed
innovators to internalizes only part of the benefits of his innovation). Cf. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839
(CCPA 1970) (dicussing that “inventor should be allowed to dominate the future patentable inventions of
others where those inventions were based in some way on hit teachings. Such improvements, while
unobvious from his teachings, are will within his contribution, since the improvement was made possible
by his work. It is equally apparent, however, that … the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable
correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the specification….”); Suzanne Scotchmer, “Protecting
Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products be Patentable?” 27 RAND J. of Econ. 322 (1996),
available at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~scotch/Sc96.pdf (arguing that under some circumstances, the
award of broad pioneering patents and withholding of subsequent improvement patents might actually
incentivize subsequent innovations).
155
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 876.
156
If the subsequent innovations and applications are truly worthwhile, licensing to enable those
technologies should make all parties better off, and hence it is economic suicide for any parties to hold out
long enough to defeat the subsequent endeavor. It is in no one’s interest to block, and everyone’s interest
to allow the invention to proceed, provided the tug-of-war to distribute the pie does not unnecessarily break
down the process. See, e.g., Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 133-34.
157
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). See, also, e.g., H. Demsetz, Toward a
Theory of Property Rights, in 1 Organization of Economic Activity 104, 112-13 (1988) (discussion of
efficient bargaining of licensing and assignments to redistribute patent rights after patents are granted);
Clark, Major & Mollett, The Development and Implementation of New Zealand's ITQ Management
System, in Rights Based Fishing 191, 196 (P. Neher, R. Arnason & N. Mollett eds. 1989) (concluding that
the market for randomly-allocated “Individual Transferable Quotas” in a fish stock management system
would lead to efficient allocation through subsequent trading of rights among firms); Merges & Nelson,
supra note 115, at 876.
158
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 12-14 (discussing how contractual transactions can help to
attain optimal use and investment of properties).
159
See Scherer, supra note 9, at 1362 (observing that the determination of “the division of rents between
the original discoverer and follow-on developers requires bargaining, and solutions may materialize that
either stalemate further progress or undermine incentives for additional private investment in basic
discovery.”); R. Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics 105 n.15 (1988) (discussing how the initial
distribution of property rights can affect the ultimate level of output despite subsequent trading of rights
among bargaining parties.). One interesting proposal to reduce information asymmetry may be to assign a
duty to patentees to make use of the patent. This ensures that patentees are involved in the process of
making active use of the patents. When patentees are so involved, the risk of large information assymetry
between the patentee and potential licensee should be drastically reduced.
160
See, e.g., M.A. Heller & R.S. Eisenberg, “Can Patents Deter Innovaiton? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research.” Science 280:698-701 (discussing the so called “anticommons” problem where
because of the lack of a natural benchmark to establish how profit between original and subsequent
innovators are to be distributed, the bargaining between those innovators to facilitate latter applications can
break down); Scotchmer, note 4, at 135-37 (noting, for example, that it is important to divde profits in
proportion to the actual costs expended by each inventor); id. at 131 (noting that “intellectual property is a
blunt instrument for [this] delicate problem”); J.R. Green & S. Scotchmer, “On the Division of Profit in
Sequential Innovation,” 26 RAND J. of Econ. 20 (1995), available at
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~scotch/Gr_and_Sc.pdf.
161
Rent seeking often arise from information asymmetry. A deal breaks down because the parties assign
irreconcilable value or expectations regarding a follow-on innovation. For example, entrenched innovators
may wish to prolong a previous generation of technologies at the expense of new entrants even though new
entrants might bring in more revenues to the original innovators in terms of license royalties. See, e.g.,
Scotchmer, note 4, at 147-48. Parties may also be looking to game each other. See, e.g., Landes & Posner,
supra note 10, at 320-21.
162
See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 321 (discussing how monopoly leads to complacency and
information asymmetry, which ultimately increases transaction costs of licensing.).
163
The Scripps and Amgen cases discussed earlier provide two prime examples, where overly broad patents
threaten to impede subsequent innovations. Patent pooling and consolidations constitute potential
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remedies. See, generally, T. O’Donoghue, S. Scotchmer, and J. F. Thisse, “Patent Breath, Patent Life and
the Pace of Technological Progress,” 7 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1 (1998); J. Lerner
& J. Tirole, “Efficient Patent Pools,” 94 American Economic Review 691 (2004). On the other hand,
patent pools pose unique problems of their own. See, e.g., J. H. Barton, “Reforming the Patent System,”
287 Science 1933 (2000) (explaining how patent pools can dilute incentives to innovate); S. Graham, B. H.
Hall, D. Harhoff, and D. Mowery, “Patent Quality Control: A Comparison of U.S. Patent Re-examinations
and European Patent Oppositions,” in W. Cohen and S. A. Merrill, eds., Patents in the Knowledge Based
Economy, 74-119 (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003) (discussing how patnet pools can
serve as barriers to new comers in the innovation process); H. Hovenkamp, M. Janis, and M. A. Lemley,
“Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes,” 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719 (2003) (discussing
how patent pools can reduce competition in the market place); C. Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket:
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting,” 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 139 (2001)
(raising various issues regarding patent pools and joint licensing schemes, such as whether pools should be
allowed where less restrictive mechanisms such as cross-licensing exist to unlock blocking patents and
hence allow for additional competition in the marketplace); Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 176-77 (noting that
pools that in general consist of complementary technologies create real value and hence are usually good
while pools that consist generally of technological substitutes create few values other than creating artificial
market monopolies and hence are usually bad).
164
There has not been a lot of schlarly writings on patent scope. A few notable exceptions include:
McFetridge & Rafiquzzaman, The Scope and Duration of the Patent Right and the Nature of Research
Rivalry, 8 Res. L. & Econ. 91 (1986); Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 150; Scherer, Nordhaus's Theory of
Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 422 (1972); J. Shoven, Intellectual
Property Rights and Economic Growth, in Intellectual Property Rights and Capital Formation in the Next
Decade 46, 49-50 (1988):
165
Broad patents are patents with scope broader than the enabled innovation. Narrow patents are patents
whose scopes are narrowly tailored to be coincident with the enabled innovation.
166
Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 294 (observing that for patents to efficiently incentivize
innovations, patent scopes should be coincident with the amount that the disclosures enable a person skilled
in the arts to practice the invention).
167
In economic terms, prospecting works by internalizing related or follow-on benefits. As discussed
earlier, broad patents may more fully compensate pioneers by helping pioneer innovators better internalize
follow-on benefits. See discussions surrounding supra note 154.
168
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265, 276-77 (1977).
169
Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 13 (describing how broad patents “enables people to reap where
they have sown. Without that prospect the incentives to sow is diminished.”).
170
Kitch, supra note 168, at 276-77.
171
See Kitch, supra note 168, at 279; Dasgupta, Patents, Priority and Imitation or, The Economics of Races
and Waiting Games, 98 Econ. J. 66 (1988) (exploring conditions where waiting is more profitable than
joining patent races); Katz & Shapiro, R & D Rivalry with Licensing or Imitation, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 402
(1987) (exploring the costs and benefits of inventing around v. licensing);
172
Id. See also N. Gandal & S. Scotchmer, “Coordinating Research through Research Joint Ventures,” 51
J. of Pub. Econ. 173 (1993) (exploring how firms can cut down the cost of innovation by delegating
specific follow up research to efficient firms); I. Brocas, “Optimal Regulation of Cooperative R&D under
Incomplete Information,” 52 J. of Ind. Org. 81 (2004) (discussing how patents promote more sharing of
information than in a competitive marketplace); Tandon, Rivalry and the Excessive Allocation of
Resources to Research, 14 Bell J. Econ. 152 (1983) (analogizing invention races to fishing races in a pool,
where “overfishing” result when too many people seek develop the same inventions).
173
See Kitch, supra note 168, at 271-75.
174
See, e.g., Kitch, supra note 168, at 285-87.
175
This seems almost too intuitive to have to assert.
176
Consider a broad patent that gives the right to A, B, and C in return for only the development of A.
Normally, rational parties would spend only up to the (risk adjusted) value of A to develop A. However
because of the legal generosity, many would now spend up to the value of A, B, and C to develop just A.
Over-incentivization is not socially desirable because it is occurs when the society has overpaid for an
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innovation. Over-incentivization occurs when the amount if the average monopoly rent exceed, after
factoring risk-adjusted interest cost adjustments, the cost of R&D. See Scherer, supra note 9, at 1350.
177
See Scherer, supra note 9, at 1360 (describing how R&D activities, like any other activities, exhibits a
diminishing rate of returns); Tim Hubbard and James Love, “A New Trade Framework for Global
Healthcare R&D,” 2 PLoS Biology 147, 150 (describing how increased patent incentives have incentivized
R&D of “diminishing returns”); Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 17-18, 322, 328 (discussing how R&D
races that produce premature technologies with no immediate application actually constitute a net social
loss). As low hanging fruits of research opportunities are picked, any additional resources poured into the
area must be used to conduct ever increasingly expensive and speculative research. See Scherer at 1360.
Alas, doubling the amount of cancer research funding, for example, would not necessarily halve the time to
a cure.
178
Patent races are the mirror image of competitive waste, with one an inherent result of broad patents and
the other an inherent result of narrow patents. Cf. Wright, The Resource Allocation Problem in R & D, in
The Economics of R & D Policy 41, 49-56 (G. Tolley ed. 1985) (discussing the economic similarity
between the general common pool model, which leads to competitive waste as multiple parties compete to
make the same follow-on innovations, and the so-called “race” models, where multiple parties compete to
make the same early pioneering innovation to attempt to corner a market).
179
All activities, including R&D, incur opportunity costs (in a world with limited resources). Broad patents
incentives encourage the deployment of resources that could be better spent elsewhere to develop
speculative or premature technologies. See supra note 177.
180
When law over recognizes innovations, it prematurely recognizes related and follow-on innovations tobe
invented when they have not been. When those innovations finally take place, the law would not recognize
them as innovations since it had believed those innovations to have already taken place. This could happen,
for example, if the law under-appreciates the prior art, leading to patent races and competitive waste in the
innovation generating process. See, e.g., Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 46. See also discussion surrounding
supra notes 176-192.
181
Some have suggested that patent incentives for biotech is not over-incentivized since the profits of U.S.
biotech and pharmaceutical industry approximates that of other industry averages. However, this is
incorrect because it is not possible to determine whether patents are over-incentivizing or underincentivizing an industry simply by examining the industry’s average returns. As Landes & Posner has also
noted, “competition for monopoly rents will … tend to transform them into costs without necessarily
producing commensurate social benefits.” Any extra profits in an industry would simply be spent on
progressively more fancy infrastructure (such as marketing) or on successively more speculative research
until the aggregate return of the entire industry reverses back to levels comparable with other industries.
See Lands & Posner, supra note 10, at 315. Similarly, as George Stigler has observed regarding the costs
of patenting, “the prospects of monopoly pricing will lead to such a scale of investment in producing
knowledge that it will return only the competitive rate of return on average.” George J. Stigler, “A Note on
Patents,” in Stigler, The Organization of Industry 123, 124 (1968).
182
See discussions surrounding supra note 127.
183
Patents are not awarded for innovations that the technological community finds important but that the
law mistakenly deems unimportant. This can happen, for example, if the law over-appreciates the prior art,
prematurely recognizing innovations that had actually not been made. See infra note 180. The problem
with under-incentivization is that too little competition and resources are invested in the innovation
generating process. See, e.g., Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 46.
184
See discussions surrounding supra note 85.
185
Kitch might not have fairly accounted for the benefits of broad patents. Broad patents may only move
competitive waste from latter to earlier rounds of the innovation life cycle. See discussions surrounding
infra note 191. The magnitude of “competitive waste” in the competition for follow-on innovations may
also not have been as great as Kitch envisioned. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 301 (observing
that “the research expenditures by the losers of the race may not be wasted … for the expenditures will
generate information that the losers may be able to use in other projects.”).
186
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989) (the Supreme Court
stating that “free competition” is “the baseline” on which “the patent system’s incentive to creative effort
depends.”); Fed'l Trade Comm'n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent
Law and Policy, A Report by the Federal Trade Commission (October 2003), 1, available at http://
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www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (“Competition through free enterprise and open markets is the
organizing principle for most of the U.S. economy. Competition among firms generally works best to
achieve optimum prices, quantity, and quality of goods and services for consumers.”); id. at 882 (While
“[t]here is broad consensus on the significant role that … patents can play to spur innovation and to
encourage the disclosure and commercial development of inventions … [t]he importance of competition as
a spur to innovation also should be recognized.”); Merges & Nelson, note 115, at 843-44.
187
See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property (Washington, DC: Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 1995)
(arguing, inter lia, that concentrations of market power tend to reduce competition to innovate and retard
progress); Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 877 (arguing that “rivalry facilitates technical advance and
unified control damps it”); supra note 186; K. Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention,” in R. Nelson, ed., The Rate and Direction of Economic Activities: Economic and Social
Factors, 609-626 (National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Series, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1962). For an interesting counter point, see Joseph Schumpeter, “Capitalism, Socialism
and Democracy,” (New York: Harper & Row, 1942) (arguing that large, monopolistic firms with access to
deep resources are more innovative than small, resource-strapped start up companies). For a balanced
discussion of both perspectives, see R. Gilbert & G. C. Sunshine, “The Use of Innovation Markets: A
Reply to Hay, Rapp and Hoerner,” 64 Antitrust L. J. 75 (1995); R. Gilbert & G. C. Sunshine,
“Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets,” 63
Antitrust L. J. 569 (1995).
188
Competition, by involving more parties throughout the innovation process, can help to reduce instances
of IP hold ups simply by increasing the number of stakeholders with important IP. See discussions
surrounding infra notes 204-207. Competition also incentivizes parties to participate longer in an
innovation process by preserving plenty of opportunities for many to compete throughout the innovation
life cycle. By incentivizing stakeholders to stay longer in an innovation process, competition help to bridge
information asymmetry gaps among IP stakeholders as participants share similar views about the
technologies than non-particants, which can reduce the transaction costs of IP usage in general.
189
Concentrating competition for patents toward the earliest phases of an innovation life cycle where there
is most uncertainty can foster wasteful speculation. Distributing competition throughout the process
enables competing patentees to pursue innovations at more rational and opportune stages. See discussions
surrounding infra note 191; Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 883-84, 903 (1990) (noting that patent
scope need to be carefully scrutinized in science-based industries because “scientific developments tend to
narrow and focus perceived technological opportunities…[where] it is anticipated that the first to apply a
scientific finding will get a patent of considerable scope.”).
190
See discussion surround supra note 172.
191
See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 319-20, 324 (explaining how increasing patent scope may
simply shift the patent race (for a broader patent) to an earlier period); id. at 202; supra note 178. For
Kitch's response, see Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 J.L. & Econ. 205, 206
(1980).
192
With broad patents, an early legal “win” can enable inventors to corner an entire field.
193
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 874-75
194
In an uncertain environment, when even pioneers can rarely predict the future direction of technologies
they help to invent (see infra note 195), coordination makes little sense. Why designate a party to
coordinate when no party is in a good position to foresee the future.
195
Here are some notoriously embarrassing past predictions about the future: “I think there is a world
market for maybe five computers” (Thomas Watson, Chairman of IBM, 1943); “'While a calculator …
[today] is equipped with 10000 vacuum tubes and weighs 30 tons, computers of the future may have only
1000 vacuum tubes and weigh only 1.5 tons.” (Popular mechanics, 1949); “I have travelled the length and
breadth of this country and talked with the best people, and I can assure you that data processing is a fad
that won't last out the year” (Editor in charge of business books for Prentice Hall, 1957); “But what... is it
good for?” (Engineer at the Advanced Computing Systems division of IBM, commenting on the microchip,
1968); “There is no reason why anyone would want a computer in the home” (Ken Olson, Present,
Chairman and founder of Digital Equipment Corporation, 1977); “640K should be enough for anybody”
(Bill Gates, CEO of Microsoft, 1981).
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196

After all, U.S. patent law, at least in principle, apply uniformly to all fields. See Dan L. Burk, “Policy
Levers in Patent Law,” 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575, 1576 (2003). (noting that “[w]ith only a few exceptions, the
statute does not distinguish between different technologies in setting and applying legal standards.”). Cf. id
at 1577 (noting however that “[a] closer examination of patent law demonstrates that it is unified only in
concept. In practice the rules actually applied to different industries increasingly diverge.”)
197
See Burk, id., at 1577 (concluding that “there is no reason to assume that a unitary patent system will
optimally encourage innovation in the wide range of diverse industries that it is expected to cover.”). For
arguments touting the benefits of applying patent law differently based on the technologies and fields
involved, see Richard C. Levin et al., “Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 783 (1987); Mark Schankerman, “How Valuable Is
Patent Protection? Estimates by Technology field,” 29 RAND Journal of Economics 77 (1998); Robert
Mazzoleni and Richard R. Nelson, “The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to
the Current Debate,” 27 Research Policy 273, 275-76 (1998); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, and
John P. Walsh, “Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)” (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7552,
2000). Quotes from http://www.mth.uct.ac.za/digest/pcquotes.html.
198
Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 880, and more specifically at 884-916.
199
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 880 (introducing the concept of the “discrete invention model”
where “an invention is discrete and well-defined, created through the inventor's insight and hard work …
[where generally] the invention does not point the way to wide ranging subsequent technical advances …
[or] define any broad prospect.”).
200
Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 882 (describing how a “new chemical product is in most cases a
discrete entity … like penicillin”), 897 (describing how “chemical product invention tends to fit the
‘discrete invention’ model.”).
201
For a more comprehensive of the dynamics involved in fields with discrete innovations, see, e.g., Nancy
Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, “Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?” in
“Innovation Policy and the Economy” 62-65 (Vol 2, Adam Jaffe, Joshua Lerner and Scott Stern, eds, MIT
Press), available at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~scotch/G_and_S.pdf.
202
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 880-81 (observing that in discrete invention industries,
“possession by [a] firm of a proprietary lock on the invention is not a serious hindrance to inventive work
by many other firms.”)
203
Many product-based industries are of this type since most products transcend and depend on a wide
diversity of technologies. Cf. Scherer, note 9, at 1363 (“A National Science Foundation–backed study of
the scientific and technological ‘‘events’’ that led to five new technologies, including the first oral
contraceptive pill, demonstrated the large number of research streams that had to converge to yield ultimate
practical embodiments.68”)
204
See Scherer, supra note 9, at 1363 (discussing the problem of rent seeking faced by barge owners when
operating along different sections of the Rhine River managed by multiple toll operators); Scotchmer, supra
note 4, at 132 (discussing how blocking patents can lead to grid lock and how innovating stakeholders
holding out to seek maximum royalties can stifle subsequent research).
205
For more details on the complex dynamics of IP licensing in fields with mutually dependent, cumulative
spheres of inventions, see generally, e.g., Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 201, at 65-69.
206
See Gallini & Scotchmer, supra note 201, at 71-72 (observing that “the optimal design of the property
right should depend on whether firms contract with others for the use of their protected innovations. With
fluid contracting, policies that otherwise would be inefficient may be optimal.”); Wesley M. Cohen,
Patents: Their Effectiveness and Role (slides prepared for the FTC/D’oJ Hearings on Competition and
Intellectual Property Law in the Knolwedge-Based Economy, Feb. 20, 2002 to summarize a recent
Carnegie-Mellon survey of R&D laboratory managers on the effectiveness of patents in stimulating
innovation) 14, available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/intellect/cohen.pdf (visited April 9, 2005) (observing
how in industries where it few firms own all the patent rights in a particular product (e.g. a computer chip),
firms are mutually dependent and more amicable to cross-licensing.).
207
Henry S. Rowen, “Serendipity or Strategy, How Technology and Markets Came to Favor Silicon
Valley” in “The Silicon Valley Edge,” 190.
208
This is not surprising because as Coase and other economists have theorized, the distribution of initial
property rights (patent rights) should not adversely affect the ultimate distribution of rights if the
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transaction cost can be minimized (which firms, forced by mutual dependence, have). See, e.g., Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing the implication of Coase in a zero-transactional-cost
setting); supra discussion surrounding supra note 157.
209
Breakthrough-based industries are sometimes young industries which, as the industry matures, evolves
to become mutually dependent, cumulative industries described above. See Merges & Nelson, supra note
115, at 908 (1990).
210
Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 907 (1990).
211
Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 884, 915 (noting that in science-based industries, “there is a real
danger that allowing patent scope to be overbroad may enable the individual or firm who first came up with
a particular practical application to control a broad array of improvements and applications” and
emphasizing “the dangers of awarding overly broad patents early in the history of an industry founded on
recent scientific advances.”).
212
Rarely is one single pioneer expected to corner the effort of follow-on developments in science-based
industries. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 319 (noting that, partly because the future of
technologies are so hard to predict, even the “original prospector may have a flawed conception of the
optimal path of development.”). In science-based industries, the rapid speeds at which breakthrough
innovations develop further argues for allowing multiple parties to participate in follow-on developments as
the diversity of expertise and the resources needed can be quite substantial.
213
The cumulative nature of science-based endeavors is clearly implied by Einstein’s famous “on the
shoulder of giants” comment. Most important technologies outside of traditional pharmaceuticals and
chemical industries fits the cumulative model. See Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 134.
214
In cumulative, mutually dependent industries, the creators of technologies are also consumers of
technologies, forming a relationship of dependence that is symmetric (mutual) among stakeholders. In
science-based industries, the creators (e.g. research institutes) and consumers of technologies (e.g. device
manufacturers) are usually distinct entities. See Scherer, note 9, at 1363 (“In biotechnology, the asymmetry
of relevant actors’ positions—ranging from university scientists through genome-researching firms, vector
providers, and instrumentation makers to specific biopharmaceutical developers—is likely to make it more
difficult to find a sufficient community of interest to organize comprehensive low-royalty crosslicensing.”). The dependence between stakeholders in science-based industries are thus often not
symmetric. See Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 131-32.
215
Scherer, note 9, at 1362 (“Bargaining stalemates are especially likely when the discoverer of A has
broad rights covering follow-on developments, but when A, like many basic scientific discoveries, has little
or no commercial value by itself”). See also, Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents
Deter Innovation? The Anti-Commons in Biomedical Research, 208 Science 698, 698 (1998).
216
As Coase has noted, if transaction costs cannot be ignored, the initial distribution of property rights
becomes of paramount importance to subsequent efficient utilization of property. See THRA'INN
EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 104-05 (1990) (recognizing that “Coase's main
contribution … was to arouse our awareness of positive transaction costs.”); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS
ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 105 n.15 (Boston, Pearson Addison Wesley, 1988).
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See, e.g., Frederic M. Scherer, Nordhaus’s Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric
Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1972); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND
ECONOMIC WELFARE (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1969).
218
Evidence tauting both the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of patents abound. See, e.g., Mueller, supra
note 49, at 23; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721, 737 (1990).
(discussing how “[w]hile the patent system is often justified as a means of providing incentives to invest in
socially valuable research and development, there are no clear answers to the empirical questions of when
these incentives are needed, or how strong the incentives should be to have an optimal impact on
behavior.”); Yali Friedman, Ph.D., “Could Patents have Sped Penicillin Development?” available at
http://biotech.about.com/library/weekly/aa_penicillinpatent.htm (discussing how one researcher’s decision
not to patent monoclonal technologies and another’s to patent recombinant DNA technologies both
facilitated the rapid developments of follow-on technologies.); Richard Levin, Alvin Klevorick, Richard R.
Nelson, and Sidney Winter, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS (Washington, 1987), 783–820 (in the socalled “Yale University survey,” finding that managers rank patents as the second least effective method
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for protecting the competitive advantages of new products and processes); Wesley J. Cohen, Richard R.
Nelson, and John P. Walsh, Firms Patent (or Not), (working paper, Carnegie–Mellon University, January
2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7552.pdf and http://www.dklevine.com/archive/cohensurvey.pdf (following up Levin’s study in a more extensive Carnegie-Mellon survey in 2000, finding that
managers rank patents as the second least effective methods for appropriating innovation value); Mariko
Sakakibara and Lee Branstetter, “Do Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? Evidence from the 1988
Japanese Patent Law Reforms,” 32 RAND Journal of Economics 77, 98-99 (2001) (recent study of Japnese
patents finding that despite Japan’s expansion of patent rights since 1988, there has been no effect on
innovation or R&D).
219
See Merges & Nelson, note 115, at 843.
220
See Merges & Nelson, note 115, at 843-44, 908-09. Also, since broad patents tend to focus competition
early while narrow patents tend to spread competition throughout (see discussions surrounding supra notes
190-192), in industries where significant follow-on resources or risk taking are required, patents should be
kept narrow so patent incentives and competition can be preserved for as many stages of innovations as
possible. See discussions surround note 246.
221
Merges & Nelson, note 115, at 844 (warning – after examining follow-on innovation patterns in
industries as diverse as electric lighting, automobile, airplane, semiconductors and computers, and
pharmaceuticals – that “[i]n many industries the efficiency gains from the pioneer's ability to coordinate are
likely to be outweighed by the loss of competition for improvements to the basic invention.”).
222
Some have suggested that the solution to broad patenting is to practice narrow claim constructions. See,
e.g., Scherer, note 9, at 1364. However, if the problem of overly broad patents can be fixed relatively
easily by simply evaluating the underlying innovation with technical competence, it would seem more
efficient to solve the problem at the source than fixing the problem later.
223
See discussions surrounding supra note 175.
224
See discussions surrounding supra notes 175-180.
225
The sequencing of the human genome is but a first step on the road toward many awe-inspiring biotech
applications. Next up is the identification of the functional role of genes: how genes regulate each other and
how genes direct a complex web of biological processes. Because genes regulate and serve as the
templates of all biochemical processes, researchers hope that genetic insights will translate to insights into
all aspects human biology, including the etymology of diseases, including cancers.225 Diagnostic and
therapeutic applications will likely arrive after solid progress in these area and also most likely in rounds.
The first application will probably consist of diagnostic techniques that foster early detection. The second
might involve innovative drugs that effectively kill targeted cancer cells. Later waves of innovations might
involve some sort of cure for cancer altogether.
226
When patents over-incentivize in one round, they will have to under-incentivize in another round. See
discussions surrounding supra note 180. Overly focusing in any one round is not desirable especially since
it is impossible to know a priori which rounds would yield the most critical innovations, if there are even
such rounds.
227
See supra note 123.
228
Biotechnological innovations and applications often build on multiple prior innovations, which can
increase transaction costs by exacerbating rent seeking problem such as hold ups. See supra notes 15, 123,
and 204.
229
See discussions surrounding supra notes 199-202.
230
Genes are template instructions that direct all life processes. Gene sequences by themselves, however,
are useless. It is the insights into and control over those life processes that will enable all the great future
biotech innovations envisioned today. Genomic maps are important, but they constitute really just a
roadmap to future discoveries. See discussions surround supra note 225; Matthew Herper, “Genome
Scientists: Gene Patents Are Bad,” Forbes (2/26/2002), available at
http://www.forbes.com/2002/06/26/0626targets.html (quoting Craig Ventur, a famous biologist who has
himself taken out many gene patents, admitting that “[b]locking another biotech or a pharmaceutical
company from trying to come up with a cure for disease really does block research and the public loses.
Why should one company say that's their unique source of biology?”); M. K. Cho, Preparing for the
Millennium: Laboratory Medicine in the 21st Century, 47-58 (AACC Press, Orlando, FL, ed. 2, 1998); J. F.
Merz, A. G. Kriss, D. G. Leonard, M. K. Cho, 415 Nature 577 (2002); 3. E. G. Campbell et al., 473 JAMA
287 (2002); L. B. Andrews, 803 Nature Rev. Genet. 3 (2002) (all four articles noting that the impact of
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gene patents on scientific research and medical care can be especially severe because there are no
alternatives to a patented gene in diagnosis, treatment, and research); Jackson, note 9, at 20 (noting that
genetic workarounds are practically impossible especially when the practice of patent portfolio and thickets
are incorporated).
231
See discussions surround supra note 208.
232
See discussions surrounding supra notes 214-215.
233
For example, broad pharmaceutical patents are awarded not just to cover the technological risks with
developing the drugs, but also the regulatory risks associated with a long FDA approval process and market
risks associated with potential competing therapeutic solutions over a long horizon.
234
For a summary of the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, see
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#nAgreement. For a recent discussion framing the
issues raised by the agreements, see “Access to Medicines Intellectual property protection: impact on
public health,” 19 WHO Drug Information 236 (2005).
235
Pharmaceutical innovations typically involve two simultaneous types of innovations: 1.) an innovation
over the discovery of a drug target – i.e. the use of a naturally occurring compound to obtain a particular
therapeutic effect; 2.) an innovation over the process to manufacture or isolate a compound with a specified
threshold of purity. A patent over the use of a compound for a specified therapeutic effect (perhaps also
with a specified threshold of side effects) would provide ample protection over drug companies’drug target
discovery efforts as well as drug companies’ FDA and marketing investments. A patent over the
manufacturing process would provide ample protection over drug companies’ efforts to innovate
industrially processes that produce naturally compounds of a claimed purify.
236
This has been safely done in industries with relatively independent spheres of innovations such as
traditional pharmaceutical industries. Cf. discussion surrounding supra notes 199-202.
237
For a good overview of various incentives to promote technological progress, see generally, e.g.,
Stephen M. Maurer and Suzanne Scotchmer, “Procuring Knowledge” in “Intellectual Property and
Entrepreneurship: Advances in the Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Growth” (Vol 15, pp. 1-31.
The Netherlands: JAI Press (Elsevier), edited by Gary D. Libecap, 2004), available at
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~scotch/prizes.pdf.
238
For hundreds of years, scientific progress has been incentivized by science-based incentives such as
recognition, prestige, and a desire to contribute to humanity. While the recent commercialization of
science has blurred the boundary between science-based and patent-based incentives somewhat, the power
of science-based incentives remains strong. See John M. Golden, “Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and
Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System,” 50 Emory L.J. 101, 110 (observing
that “even in the present age of ‘entrepreneurial science’ and even within industry itself, the values and
incentives that motivate biotechnology researchers tend to be closer to the ‘public sector values’ associated
with university-based science than to the values associated with a market-oriented focus on maximum
financial profit.”); Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 306-07 (observing “[i]n effect, basic research is
incentivized by a reward system that involves prestigious academic appointments, lecture fees, grants that
reduce teaching loads, and the prospect of Nobel and other prizes while applied research … is incentivized
by intellectual property rights.”).
239
See Zvi Griliches, Ariel Pakes, and Bronwyn H. Hall, “The Value of Patents as Indicators of Inventive
Activity,” in Economic Policy and Technical Performance 97, 120 (Partha Dasgupta and Paul Stoneman
eds. 1987) (finding that “while the aggregate value of patent rights appears to be quite high, it is estimated
to be only on the order of 10 to 15 percent of total national expenditures on R&D. Hence it is unlikely to
be the major factor in determining the overall level of [innovations].”); F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance 447 (2d ed. 1980) (describing under what conditions firms may find
investment in innovation profitable even without patent protection).
240
See discussions surrounding supra notes 228-232.
241
See, e.g., supra notes 186 and 144.
242
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 115, at 873-79; Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Evolutionary
Theorizing in Economics, 16 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 23, 33-39 (Spring 2002). See also generally RICHARD
R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (Cambridge,
Massachusetts, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1982).
243
See supra note 194 and 195. In endeavors where the impediment to innovations is resource deficiency
not scientific uncertainty, central command might make sense, as in the case of the Manhattan project
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where the government took command of the development of the nuclear bomb. Rowen, supra note 18, at
186 (noting that “[t]here are circumstances in which central control of technology is appropriate, indeed
essential, as in the Manhattan Project during World War II or the race to the moon. But the record shows
that when there is rapid technological change, as in the computer industry, and much uncertainty about
which of many possible paths will be successful, a decentralized system in which many ventures are tried is
more likely to succeed than a centralized one.”)
244
The skillset needed for developing pioneering and follow-on innovations can be very diverse. See, e.g.,
Scherer, supra note 9, at 1362 (“[T]he kinds of competence needed for follow-on work may be quite
different from what was needed to make the initial discovery. The different capabilities of university
researchers as compared with industrial R&D teams are an obvious example.”); Jackson, supra note 9, at
15 (observing that expertise needed for gene isolation and subsequent applications involving the gene
fragment are drastically different.)
245
See Scherer, supra note 9, at 1362 (“[A] single entity is not likely to perceive and back financially all the
various derivative development possibilities. FN61”).
246
A benefit of spreading competition is that it removes the incentive of parties to compete early in the
innovation process, when the technology is least certain and most speculative to a more rational time later
in the innovation cycle.
247
See discussion surrounding supra note 189.
248
See discussions surrounding supra notes 152 and 154. However, they key is to do so without
disincentivizing subsequent innovators. As Scotchmer has noted, the key is to introduce “incentive
mechanisms … to make sure that earlier innovators are compensated for their contributions, while ensuring
that later innovators also have an incentive to invest.” Scotchmer, supra note 4, at 127.
249
See supra note 195.
250
If the follow-on innovations are really that predictable, the pioneer would probably, simply on first
mover advantages of having built up expertise in the area, be the party most likely to make and corner the
patent rights of the envisioned follow-on innovations regardless of the original patent scope. Broad
patents are not necessary for original pioneers to internalize follow-on benefits since in predictable
environments they are expected to make the follow-on innovations anyways Non-patent incentives
include head start, expertise retention, professional recognition, etc. See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 9, at
1350.
251
Some examples of duds from Popular Mechanics – 1928: predicting that 50-100 years into the future,
“milk and butter will be derived from kerosene instead of cows”; 1932: agreeing with Churchill that “We
shall escape the absurdity of growing a whole chicken in order to eat the breast or wing, by growing these
parts separately under a suitable medium”; 1940: predicting that robots will end the need for humans to
perform drudgery work; several times since 1940: predicting the existence of flying car in every American
garage; 1941: predicting in less than 50 years nuclear powered car that will drive “5,000,000 miles without
refueling”; 1950: predicting that people will all be living in mobile homes made of synthetic materials since
natural resources such as “by 2000, wood, brick and stone [will become] too expensive” for such uses;
1954: predicting that by 2004 “Air transportation [will make] the multi-family apartment house obsolete, as
each family now needs a private landing strip.” See “Greatest Hits (And Misses) Of Popular Mechanics,”
available at http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/time_machine/1288761.html?page=3&c=y.
252
Despite the similarities between pharmaceutical product and gene product patents, I do concede one
significant difference. Pharmaceutical patents typically cover discrete innovations, which overlap little
with subsequent innovations, while gene patents involve basic knowledge type innovations that subsequent
innovations will depend. Pharmaceutical product patents are often justified on the ground that they are
much easier to enforce than process and use patents. Despite the convenience, the use of pharmaceutical
product patents as proxies for process and use patents can be justified in the end only because the downside
of broad pharmaceutical patents is limited due to the discrete nature of typical pharmaceutical innovations
(note the Amgen and Scripps examples show that this is not always the case). The same cannot be said of
gene innovations. Almost all foreseeable future discoveries and applications in biotechnology will rely in
some way on the use of a set of (limited) genes sequenced today. Broad gene patents will drastically
impede these future innovations. Unlike pharmaceutical patents, gene patents can not serve as an effective
proxy for genetic innovations.

Page 45 of 49

253

As discussed earlier, each pharmaceutical innovation typically involves a combination of process
innovation over the extraction or manufacturing processes and use innovation over the use of the a
compound to deliver a specific therapeutic effect. See supra note 235, discussions surrounding 130-133.
254
For the most part today, genes are sequenced and isolated from nature rather than created artificially. In
the future, if scientists start modifying sequences or creating sequences de novo rather than just copying
and transferring genes from one source to another, that might be another matter.
255
Sequencing have become increasingly routine and need not be incentivized through patents. See supra
notes 20 and 27.
256
The discovery of a gene’s sequence or function constitutes basic scientific knowledge or discovery of a
natural phenomenon, which has traditionally been deemed nonpatentable and incentivized through extrapatent incentives such traditional science-based prestige and recognition. See discussions surrounding
supra notes 49-50; supra notes 53 and 238.
257
For example, the use of a gene or a set of genes (as in DNA micro arrays) to diagnose a disease could be
patentable if the use of the gene or set of genes is not obvious given a disease’s etymology (assuming that a
disease’s etymology, as subject matter of a basic science, is not patentable. See discussions surrounding
supra notes 49-50; supra note 238.). Similarly, the use of a gene to produce a drug or the targeting of a
gene to treat a disease could also be patentable if the use of the gene or set of genes is not obvious given
basic scientific knowledge of the underlying biology.
258
Jackson, note 9, at 17 (noting that “firms that hold the patents on genes involved in breast cancer and
Alzheimer’s disease have reportedly exercised their patent-given right to be the sole performer of tests for
those defects”); id. (noting that “Physicians and academic medical centers have asserted that high fees and
strict licensing terms are already making it difficult to do diagnostic genetic tests for patented genes.”).
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